ROL_2017-07-31_16k.timecode

[00:00.000 --> 00:07.000]  Today in history, the year 1938, an unprecedented swarm of grasshoppers descends into the world
[00:30.000 --> 00:35.000]  on crops throughout the American heartland, devastating millions of acres, Iowa, Nebraska,
[00:35.000 --> 00:42.000]  and South Dakota, already in the midst of a bad drought, suffered the most from this grasshopper disaster today in history.
[00:46.000 --> 00:51.000]  In recent years, yesterday, Tuesday, police chiefs from three of the five biggest cities in the state
[00:51.000 --> 00:56.000]  spoke out at the Texas Capitol against the transgender bathroom bill, being considered by the Republican
[00:56.000 --> 01:01.000]  legislator as discriminatory and in divergence of resources that won't keep people safe.
[01:01.000 --> 01:05.000]  The police chiefs were joined by public school officials, advocates for sexual assault survivors,
[01:05.000 --> 01:12.000]  representatives from the Harris County and El Paso Sheriff's offices, the Corpus Christi ISD chief of police and others.
[01:12.000 --> 01:18.000]  The main issue, as Austin police chief Brian Manley put it, is that if, quote, a bill like this were to be passed,
[01:18.000 --> 01:24.000]  that would pull police officers' time away from combating violent crime into enforcing a bathroom bill.
[01:24.000 --> 01:29.000]  It makes communities less safe, since it is time not spent ensuring community safety.
[01:29.000 --> 01:34.000]  The legislation would restrict bathroom use in schools and local government buildings by superseding
[01:34.000 --> 01:39.000]  and nullifying parts of local non-discrimination ordinances meant to allow transgender residents,
[01:39.000 --> 01:44.000]  which make up less than 1% of the population, the claim to use the public bathroom of their choice.
[01:44.000 --> 01:56.000]  The bill did pass just after midnight last night. The Senate voted 21 to 10, and it now goes to the House for consideration.
[01:56.000 --> 02:00.000]  An information technology staffer for former chairwoman of the Democratic National Committee
[02:00.000 --> 02:05.000]  Representative Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Democrat from Florida, and Ron Awan, a 37-year-old,
[02:05.000 --> 02:10.000]  was arrested on Monday by FBI agents in U.S. Capitol Police at Dolly's International Airport
[02:10.000 --> 02:16.000]  while attempting to flee to Lahore, Pakistan. He was charged with big fraud in the U.S. District Court on Tuesday,
[02:16.000 --> 02:21.000]  where he pleaded not guilty. According to federal court documents, officials were accusing Awan and his wife,
[02:21.000 --> 02:26.000]  Hina Alvi, of defrauding the Congressional Federal Credit Union of $165,000
[02:26.000 --> 02:33.000]  by lying on a home equity loan application and not listing the home that they were getting a loan for as a rental property.
[02:33.000 --> 02:39.000]  Awan was released and is under a high-intensity supervision program with his hearing scheduled for the 21st of August.
[02:39.000 --> 02:44.000]  Awan's lawyer Christopher Gowan said that the charges are politically motivated and, quote,
[02:44.000 --> 02:51.000]  began as part of a frenzy of anti-Muslim bigotry in the literal heart of our democracy, the House of Representatives.
[02:51.000 --> 03:10.000]  This is Root 30 with your loadout for July 26, 2017.
[03:21.000 --> 03:50.000]  All right, folks. Good evening.
[03:50.000 --> 03:55.000]  This is the Monday Night Rule of Law radio show with your host, Eddie Craig.
[03:55.000 --> 04:04.000]  It is July 31, 2017. We are now just more than halfway through this new year,
[04:04.000 --> 04:12.000]  and we are getting closer and closer to yet another new year and another new distinction in the loss of liberty for Americans.
[04:12.000 --> 04:20.000]  Every time we turn around, we're trying to argue about what our rights are with people that don't care.
[04:20.000 --> 04:28.000]  Right now, one of the biggest debates that's coming to the floor in the Texas legislature is tax, property tax reform.
[04:28.000 --> 04:36.000]  These idiots do not seem to get the concept that property tax doesn't need reformation. It needs abolishment.
[04:36.000 --> 04:43.000]  It's not legal. It's not constitutional. It has never been constitutional.
[04:43.000 --> 04:51.000]  You could take that violation of rights and property and apply it to virtually anything that's going on in this country right now.
[04:51.000 --> 04:58.000]  You have the courts ruling that your rights are different when you're traveling in your car on the public highway than they are when you're sitting in your home,
[04:58.000 --> 05:04.000]  which I agree with only to a certain point, and then I do not.
[05:04.000 --> 05:17.000]  To say that they can treat you differently because you're in a public venue inside your car is to say that basically the same argument could eventually be applied to your home.
[05:17.000 --> 05:25.000]  You're in your home, but your home is in the public. Even if your home is on your property, which your car is on your property,
[05:25.000 --> 05:30.000]  your property just happens to be shared with other neighbors, the road.
[05:30.000 --> 05:35.000]  You all are co-owners of it. The state doesn't own it.
[05:35.000 --> 05:44.000]  The other issue there becomes the state being the one determining what the rights of the people are rather than the people themselves.
[05:44.000 --> 05:54.000]  A power we did not ever delegate to government. Why would we delegate such a power to government?
[05:54.000 --> 06:04.000]  Now that being said, I want to take that sort of context and I want to go through one of the two documents that was put in the last article up on my legal blog
[06:04.000 --> 06:14.000]  at toweloflaw.wordpress.com. If you haven't gone to the blog and looked at the last article up there, you need to do so.
[06:14.000 --> 06:23.000]  That article contains a full motion that's a plea to the jurisdiction for speeding in Texas.
[06:23.000 --> 06:33.000]  If you cannot defeat a speeding allegation based upon what's in the two documents in that blog article, you don't deserve to win, folks,
[06:33.000 --> 06:46.000]  because everything you need to know is there. The article is titled Catch and Release the Notice to Appear Scam, and that's exactly what it is.
[06:46.000 --> 06:55.000]  Right now the Texas courts have this thing about the cop is requiring you to sign a notice to appear on every citation.
[06:55.000 --> 07:03.000]  The cop is threatening you or inciting violence against you if you won't sign the citation.
[07:03.000 --> 07:07.000]  He takes you to jail if you won't sign the citation.
[07:07.000 --> 07:21.000]  When, in fact, the law is very clear that there are only two transportation code offenses where the obtaining of a promise to appear signature is required.
[07:21.000 --> 07:36.000]  Only two, and of those two, one of them absolutely certifiably does not apply to the general public, period.
[07:36.000 --> 07:53.000]  And therein lies the rub. They are using coercive measures to obtain a signature based upon a stop that the law itself does not require them to make.
[07:53.000 --> 08:06.000]  You really need to read the first document, which is a legal white paper on the issue of what Chapter 543 of the Transportation Code actually is authorizing officers to do,
[08:06.000 --> 08:24.000]  and the level of personal discretion it's giving them as to whether or not to endanger the life and property of the people of Texas or anyone else that they are going to pursue to issue a citation for an offense that the law itself makes very clear
[08:24.000 --> 08:32.000]  they have no legal duty to issue a citation for that requires a signature.
[08:32.000 --> 08:58.000]  Okay, that article is very telling, it is very detailed, and it puts the law right in your face to see exactly how the legislature has robbed you of your rights by authorizing an officer to commit the act itself that the Constitution spits upon as being wholly unreasonable.
[08:58.000 --> 09:17.000]  Imagine if you will giving a police officer with a severe attitude problem like most of them have the absolute power to decide for themselves with no direction of any kind as to whether or not to endanger the public by initiating a high speed pursuit
[09:17.000 --> 09:36.000]  and forcing a signature on a document that the law does not require a signature upon, that not only endangered the public generally in the manner of the pursuit, it endangered the individual being pursued when the officer tends to escalate the stop
[09:36.000 --> 09:44.000]  into an act of violence to get something that the law does not even require him to get.
[09:44.000 --> 09:55.000]  And they understand that they have given the schoolyard bully permission to be a bigger bully without repercussion.
[09:55.000 --> 10:19.000]  Now that being said, the issue this raises is officer immunity. The officer cannot be sued for any act he commits when the act itself was completely discretionary under the law.
[10:19.000 --> 10:48.000]  And that's exactly what the legislature did here. The problem is, is that when they made that discretionary duty one that was 100% unnecessary to the furtherance of justice and to obtain an actual necessity, that legislation became wholly unreasonable on its face.
[10:48.000 --> 10:58.000]  The bill of rights in both the federal and state constitutions forbids unreasonable searches and seizures.
[10:58.000 --> 11:12.000]  And the entire premise of that white paper is that the statutory scheme as written under chapter 543 does the absolute unreasonable.
[11:12.000 --> 11:37.000]  It empowers an officer to create a situation that is dangerous to everyone involved up to the point of actually life threatening to serve absolutely no legitimate purpose, even if they use their discretion to take action.
[11:37.000 --> 11:43.000]  Now if you don't understand why that's a problem, you're a lost cause, plain and simple.
[11:43.000 --> 11:49.000]  However, what I'm going to talk about for the first part of the show tonight is the second document.
[11:49.000 --> 12:00.000]  We are using that document and I put it out there for free for you guys because the biggest citation written in Texas is always a speeding citation.
[12:00.000 --> 12:13.000]  It's always the premise for a stop even if a ticket isn't written. It's generally the basic premise they use to say you were speeding, but I'm not going to write you a ticket for that, which is complete BS.
[12:13.000 --> 12:19.000]  Or it is used to generate revenue by being the biggest funded citation they put out there.
[12:19.000 --> 12:28.000]  But it's a scam. It's a complete and total scam. The second document details that out very, very plainly.
[12:28.000 --> 12:48.000]  So I'm going to skip over the section dealing with the crimes the officer commits by initiating this fraudulent action against an individual and get right into the meat of fighting the allegation itself and the shaky legal ground that the cop and the court are both on in trying to prosecute this case.
[12:48.000 --> 13:02.000]  Now, I'm going to begin at the bottom of page nine of that document. If you have not got it, so you can follow along, go to tau of law, t-a-o-o-f-l-a-w dot wordpress.com.
[13:02.000 --> 13:13.000]  Go to the article title, catch and release the notice to appear scam and download the two documents and open up and follow along in the second.
[13:13.000 --> 13:21.000]  So at the bottom of page nine here, what we're looking at is I've got about slightly less than four minutes to get through part of this.
[13:21.000 --> 13:33.000]  What we're looking at is the following title. Officer lacks lawfully delegated authority to enforce and perform arrests relating to transportation code offenses.
[13:33.000 --> 13:40.000]  Now in Texas, when you read the transportation code, I'm going to set the criteria here for you so I can start reading when we get back out to the break.
[13:40.000 --> 13:52.000]  The transportation code chapter by chapter is very clear that only the agency identified as the department in that chapter has enforcement authority under that chapter.
[13:52.000 --> 14:02.000]  Now in the constitutional challenge to the code as a whole, I detail each of those chapters and what specific state agency has authority within those chapters.
[14:02.000 --> 14:12.000]  The DPS's chapters are numerous, but they are the sole entity given enforcement powers in those chapters. No one else is.
[14:12.000 --> 14:23.000]  And in those chapters, it specifically tells us that the officers of the department are the ones that must do these enforcement things, period.
[14:23.000 --> 14:37.000]  Even where it speaks to any peace officer, I've explained exactly why that cannot be read in a manner that encompasses peace officers according to the definition of 2.12 of the code of criminal procedure.
[14:37.000 --> 14:48.000]  Because if that is the case, and the legislature does not say that's the case, when it defines peace officer in the transportation code for these sections,
[14:48.000 --> 14:57.000]  if that is the case, then it nullifies the definition of department as a whole throughout every one of these chapters.
[14:57.000 --> 15:17.000]  It nullifies every statute that says an officer of the department or an agent of the department. It completely nullifies all of that if the interpretation of any peace officer means anyone listed under 2.12 code of criminal procedure.
[15:17.000 --> 15:28.000]  Since the one statute cannot invalidate the clear language of the other or supersede it unless it specifically says it does so, which it does not,
[15:28.000 --> 15:38.000]  then the limitation becomes obvious under the rules of statutory construction and interpretation and the rules of construction of laws generally.
[15:38.000 --> 15:48.000]  The case law that I've got included in this motion is very clear that the courts must take the statutes as they find them. They are not free to rewrite them.
[15:48.000 --> 15:54.000]  They are not free to take away or add to the language they contain in any way.
[15:54.000 --> 16:09.000]  That goes entirely to my argument that I've made before numerous times that if a court attempts to interpret a statute in a manner that the clear language does not support,
[16:09.000 --> 16:16.000]  the court is legislating from the bench, which it has no authority to do.
[16:16.000 --> 16:35.000]  If the clear language of the statute cannot be reconciled in the way they're attempting to interpret it, then the statute has to be declared unconstitutional as being vague and ambiguous because it does not directly support the interpretation the court is attempting to make.
[16:35.000 --> 16:43.000]  It is judicial fraud for them to do that, and yet they do it constantly.
[16:43.000 --> 16:52.000]  If you're not aware that they're doing it and how they're doing it, how do you intend to say or do anything to object and prevent it?
[16:52.000 --> 17:21.000]  Therein, folks, lies the rub and the reason that we're here. Y'all hang on. We'll be right back after this break.
[17:23.000 --> 17:27.000]  I'm going to throw away these yucky cookies in the trash.
[17:27.000 --> 17:33.000]  I click control, shift, delete, and then scroll down to cookies and clear them.
[17:33.000 --> 17:34.000]  Bye bye yucky cookies.
[17:34.000 --> 17:42.000]  Now I go to logosradionetwork.com and I click on the Amazon box on the upper right-hand side, bookmark the link,
[17:42.000 --> 17:47.000]  and I can go to Amazon through this link and order you some yummy new cookies.
[17:47.000 --> 17:49.000]  No cookies? Or me?
[17:49.000 --> 17:53.000]  Consider it an early Christmas present, and every time I order on Amazon,
[17:53.000 --> 17:57.000]  I go through this link and I give a little present to this radio network too.
[17:57.000 --> 17:58.000]  See you for cookies.
[17:58.000 --> 18:00.000]  See you for classified.
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[20:35.000 --> 20:37.000]  Alright folks, we are back.
[20:37.000 --> 20:39.000]  This is Rule of Law Radio.
[20:39.000 --> 20:43.000]  If you are listening and you're trying to call in, the phones are currently off.
[20:43.000 --> 20:47.000]  Until I get done presenting the material that I'm working on.
[20:47.000 --> 20:49.000]  So please try back.
[20:49.000 --> 20:52.000]  I will let you know when I'm going to turn the phones on and start taking your calls.
[20:52.000 --> 20:54.000]  Please just be patient.
[20:54.000 --> 20:56.000]  I will let you know when they're on.
[20:56.000 --> 20:59.000]  Right now they are not, so you are not going to be able to get in.
[20:59.000 --> 21:05.000]  Now, the information we're about to go through, I've gone through before,
[21:05.000 --> 21:11.000]  but we're going to try to put it all together in this one motion so that you can understand how this scheme is set up to work,
[21:11.000 --> 21:17.000]  that they're doing, and how we're challenging it so as to stop them.
[21:17.000 --> 21:25.000]  Now, there are of course additional documents you're going to have to generate to go with this in the form of written objections and everything else
[21:25.000 --> 21:31.000]  when the court is not going to comply with law.
[21:31.000 --> 21:41.000]  And when the court is not going to comply with law, you've got to have a way to force them down the right road to do so and preserve that for appeal.
[21:41.000 --> 21:49.000]  So what we're going to have to do is write written objections whenever they don't follow the case law,
[21:49.000 --> 21:54.000]  whenever they don't follow the code of criminal procedure, whenever they violate our rights,
[21:54.000 --> 22:04.000]  whatever they say or do something that's prejudicial, basically we want to document everything to such a degree that before this case can actually go to trial,
[22:04.000 --> 22:10.000]  we have enough to get that judge removed from the bench for corruption.
[22:10.000 --> 22:20.000]  If you document this case right, you will have everything you need to at least try to make that happen because there's no question they're corrupt.
[22:20.000 --> 22:24.000]  There's no question they don't follow the rules.
[22:24.000 --> 22:29.000]  The only question is whether or not you have enough knowledge to catch them at it.
[22:29.000 --> 22:35.000]  And once again, that's what we're here to help you understand on how to do it and where to find it.
[22:35.000 --> 22:41.000]  This knowledge is essential to your ability to fight back and to protect yourself.
[22:41.000 --> 22:45.000]  Ignore it at your peril, okay?
[22:45.000 --> 22:49.000]  That being said, let's go through some of the arguments that are in this.
[22:49.000 --> 22:58.000]  Now, we begin on the premise that whatever officer or number of officers that stopped, performed the stop,
[22:58.000 --> 23:07.000]  have provided no documentary evidence proving that she, he, or they possess any lawfully delegated authority from the Texas Department of Public Safety
[23:07.000 --> 23:19.000]  to enforce any provision of the transportation code to perform any arrest and association therewith, as is legally required by Title 37, Part 1, Chapter 4, Sub-Chapter B,
[23:19.000 --> 23:24.000]  rules 4.14 of the Texas Administrative Code.
[23:24.000 --> 23:34.000]  Furthermore, public information requests dated whatever date and received on whatever date and a motion for discovery dated whatever date and received on whatever date
[23:34.000 --> 23:45.000]  were filed via personal delivery certified mail, regular mail, or process server on such and such date with and then whatever entity, agency, or officer they were filed with,
[23:45.000 --> 23:56.000]  requesting copies of all training and certification records relating to and then each specific officer that was part of the stop that you're requesting the information on.
[23:56.000 --> 24:06.000]  And we're wanting their training and certification records pursuant rules 4.13 and 4.14 of the Administrative Code,
[24:06.000 --> 24:17.000]  which is mandatory in order for local law enforcement to receive the required specially delegated enforcement authority from the DPS relative to the transportation code.
[24:17.000 --> 24:30.000]  That's the only way that's stated in the statutes that a local officer gets authorized to enforce the transportation code and become an agent of the department, which is the Department of Public Safety.
[24:30.000 --> 24:35.000]  That's exactly how it's defined in every one of these chapters, okay?
[24:35.000 --> 24:48.000]  In a response to the aforementioned PIRs and motion for discovery, respondent received a written statement signed by whatever officer, records clerk, or whatever, in whatever agency that more or less reads,
[24:48.000 --> 24:59.000]  we have no records responsive to your request, or the city, county of whatever does not enforce the transportation code or specific chapters of the transportation code.
[24:59.000 --> 25:08.000]  Either way, you have an admission that the officers in question had no lawful authority to perform the stop.
[25:08.000 --> 25:11.000]  There's the first nail in their coffin.
[25:11.000 --> 25:29.000]  This response serves as evidently proof that the city, county, or state cannot demonstrate with proper evidence that these officers are properly and legally trained and certified as required by law to act in the capacitive of a specially authorized DPS agent, peace officer,
[25:29.000 --> 25:35.000]  with lawful authority to enforce and arrest under any and all provisions of the transportation code.
[25:35.000 --> 25:53.000]  Thus, officers, these officers knowingly and willfully acted illegally, under color of law, and without proper lawful and legal authority by impersonating a duly authorized DPS agent, peace officer for the purposes of enforcing the statutory provisions of the transportation code,
[25:53.000 --> 25:56.000]  which constitutes a felony offense.
[25:56.000 --> 25:58.000]  They impersonated a police officer.
[25:58.000 --> 26:01.000]  That's a felony in Texas.
[26:01.000 --> 26:14.000]  In this particular case, only the Department of Public Safety are authorized police officers for the purpose of enforcing the transportation code, not the local cops, unless they have been authorized in the manner prescribed by law.
[26:14.000 --> 26:29.000]  These PIRs and discovery motion that we've got says they don't have any records that these officers are certified for that, which means they're not authorized to do so, which means they're impersonating a DPS officer and that's a crime.
[26:29.000 --> 26:30.000]  Okay?
[26:30.000 --> 26:34.000]  Now, that's the second nail in their coffin.
[26:34.000 --> 26:48.000]  This initial act of knowing and willful falsification and usurpation of legal authority then resulted in the subsequent perpetration of the numerous other aforementioned high crimes and misdemeanors committed under color of law by the officers.
[26:48.000 --> 27:02.000]  Now, at the beginning of this, I have an entire list of criminal offenses that every single unauthorized officer in Texas commits legally, point by point, the moment they initiate a traffic stop without lawful authority.
[27:02.000 --> 27:05.000]  And most every cop in Texas is guilty of this.
[27:05.000 --> 27:24.000]  Right now, it would appear that the Department of Public Safety is actually guilty of issuing certifications to some officers that are not qualified to have that certification under the statutes because the criteria set forth in rules 4.13 and 4.14 are multiple criteria.
[27:24.000 --> 27:39.000]  And some of these officers that are named in these particular certifications do not meet the criteria because the municipality does not meet the criteria or the county does not meet the criteria.
[27:39.000 --> 27:49.000]  And that alone is a problem because the DPS is now willfully violating their mandate under the law as to who they can actually certify.
[27:49.000 --> 27:54.000]  So it becomes a twofold issue over the criminality of the actions.
[27:54.000 --> 27:56.000]  Next section.
[27:56.000 --> 28:04.000]  Officer lacked articulable probable cause for perpetrating a warrantless seizure and arrest of respondent.
[28:04.000 --> 28:13.000]  Now, remember that no court will recognize the warrantless arrest as being unlawful unless it is first challenged as being unlawful.
[28:13.000 --> 28:25.000]  So the very first thing we do in here besides accuse the officer of committing multiple crimes is to establish the fact that the stop was illegal and unlawful on its face.
[28:25.000 --> 28:32.000]  There was no probable cause, no way to get probable cause, and the officer acted illegally.
[28:32.000 --> 28:34.000]  Now let's get into how this works.
[28:34.000 --> 28:49.000]  As respondent was never engaged in any professional or occupational activity relating to transportation, nor was respondent presumptively or visibly engaged in operating or driving a commercial motor vehicle.
[28:49.000 --> 28:55.000]  Remember now, this is the requirement under 201.904 of the transportation code.
[28:55.000 --> 29:13.000]  The speed signs on the highway only apply to commercial motor vehicles, which means in order for the officer to apply the posted speed limit to any car he sees, he must first make an accurate determination that the car is one of those to which the speed sign actually applies.
[29:13.000 --> 29:19.000]  And 201.904 is very, very clear that it only applies to commercial motor vehicles.
[29:19.000 --> 29:33.000]  Therefore, there is no way the officer had probable cause to make the stop unless you were actually in something that could have been honestly mistaken for a commercial motor vehicle.
[29:33.000 --> 29:41.000]  Okay, so we'll pick this up on the other side and finish up that paragraph and that particular argument.
[29:41.000 --> 29:49.000]  In the meantime, folks, you all hang on. We're going to take another break and I will get back to this as soon as we return.
[29:49.000 --> 29:59.000]  Let's go.
[30:19.000 --> 30:27.000]  When you give up data about yourself, you'll never get it back again. And once your privacy is gone, you'll find your freedoms will start to vanish too.
[30:27.000 --> 30:35.000]  So protect your rights. Say no to surveillance and keep your information to yourself. Privacy. It's worth hanging on to.
[30:35.000 --> 30:46.000]  This public service announcement is brought to you by StartPage.com, the private search engine alternative to Google, Yahoo, and Bing. Start over with StartPage.
[30:46.000 --> 30:51.000]  My friend Liz burnt her arm in a cast iron pan the other day. Ouch.
[30:51.000 --> 30:58.000]  She ran cold water over the burn, but the pain remains. Plus, she was concerned about blisters. So she turned to the internet for advice.
[30:58.000 --> 31:04.000]  There she stumbled on a seemingly crazy home remedy suggested by the people's pharmacy, cold yellow mustard.
[31:04.000 --> 31:13.000]  She applied mustard to the burn and the pain stopped right away. Then she bandaged the area. In the next day, she was pain-free with no blisters.
[31:13.000 --> 31:21.000]  Serious burns require a trip to the doctor or the hospital. But for minor burns, you might want to give common yellow mustard a try. It seems to work.
[31:21.000 --> 31:48.000]  I'm Dr. Catherine Albrecht. More news and information at CatherineAlbrecht.com.
[31:51.000 --> 32:01.000]  Does the job of 10 product that saves you space, time, and money? Call 888-910-4367 only at SUSA.org.
[32:21.000 --> 32:26.000]  This is the least expensive opportunity to learn how to enforce and preserve our rights through due process.
[32:26.000 --> 32:36.000]  Former Sheriff's Deputy Eddie Craig, in conjunction with Rule of Law Radio, has put together the most comprehensive teaching tool available that will help you understand what due process is and how to hold courts to the rule of law.
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[32:46.000 --> 32:51.000]  The original 2009 seminar, hundreds of research documents, and other useful resource material.
[32:51.000 --> 32:55.000]  Learn how to fight for your rights with the help of this material from ruleoflawradio.com.
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[33:02.000 --> 33:12.000]  Live Free Speech Radio, LogosRadioNetwork.com.
[33:12.000 --> 33:18.000]  I'm on the highway to hell.
[33:18.000 --> 33:24.000]  I'm on the highway to hell.
[33:24.000 --> 33:30.000]  I'm on the highway to hell.
[33:30.000 --> 33:37.000]  Don't stop me!
[33:37.000 --> 33:46.320]  Alright folks, we are back and right now we are going to finish up on this but before
[33:46.320 --> 33:52.520]  I get back into this again, one of the things I need to get into, folks we need your support
[33:52.520 --> 33:54.280]  in the fundraiser.
[33:54.280 --> 33:58.120]  Please keep in mind that this network runs on your donations.
[33:58.120 --> 34:03.240]  Right now we've got a lot of bills that have come in on this and we don't have any idea
[34:03.240 --> 34:04.920]  how we're going to get them paid.
[34:04.920 --> 34:07.560]  The fundraiser is still ongoing.
[34:07.560 --> 34:15.520]  The seminar package for the transportation stuff is still being sold.
[34:15.520 --> 34:16.520]  We just need your help.
[34:16.520 --> 34:17.520]  It's that simple.
[34:17.520 --> 34:20.960]  We don't have enough to go around and they're charging too much for what we're getting
[34:20.960 --> 34:23.000]  and of course that's the way it is for everybody.
[34:23.000 --> 34:24.680]  We fully understand that.
[34:24.680 --> 34:28.560]  But we can't be here to help you if y'all aren't here to help us.
[34:28.560 --> 34:32.680]  This is how we manage to stay on the air and do the things that need to be done so that
[34:32.680 --> 34:37.120]  this information and assistance can be brought to you.
[34:37.120 --> 34:41.360]  Please keep us in your financial prayers and donations as much as you can as often as you
[34:41.360 --> 34:42.360]  can.
[34:42.360 --> 34:43.360]  It's what keeps us going.
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[34:45.880 --> 34:48.960]  None of us here are rich and none of us are rolling in the dough.
[34:48.960 --> 34:52.680]  So please keep that in mind whenever you can.
[34:52.680 --> 34:56.640]  That being said, let's go ahead and pick this back up.
[34:56.640 --> 35:01.640]  As respondent was never engaged in any professional or occupational activity relating to transportation
[35:01.640 --> 35:06.440]  nor was respondent presumptively or visibly engaged in operating or driving a commercial
[35:06.440 --> 35:14.520]  motor vehicle as required by sections 201.904 and 545.351 through 352 of the transportation
[35:14.520 --> 35:19.720]  code to apply the posted speed limit on the speed sign to respondent and respondent's
[35:19.720 --> 35:21.840]  private conveyance.
[35:21.840 --> 35:28.040]  Respondent also challenges the constitutionality and legality of his or her warrantless seizure
[35:28.040 --> 35:33.840]  and arrest by the officers as said officers lack any reasonable and articulable suspicion
[35:33.840 --> 35:38.600]  or probable cause to suspect or believe that respondent was engaged in any professional
[35:38.600 --> 35:44.080]  or occupational use of the highways for the purpose of engaging in transportation or operating
[35:44.080 --> 35:46.600]  driving a commercial motor vehicle.
[35:46.600 --> 35:52.160]  In other words, there was nothing that would give the officer the necessary probable cause
[35:52.160 --> 35:57.360]  to determine that your car was a commercial motor vehicle that was subject to the posted
[35:57.360 --> 36:00.400]  speed sign, period.
[36:00.400 --> 36:06.080]  Now this goes back to the case law on the court being required to accept the statutes
[36:06.080 --> 36:08.080]  as they find them.
[36:08.080 --> 36:14.360]  These courts right now are trying to deny that this limitation in the statute is limited
[36:14.360 --> 36:20.080]  only to commercial motor vehicles, yet that is exactly what it says.
[36:20.080 --> 36:26.520]  They attempt to argue that we're leaving something out, yet they don't produce any other information
[36:26.520 --> 36:31.400]  to substantiate that we're leaving something out, or another statute that says it applies
[36:31.400 --> 36:37.360]  beyond the thing that 201.904 specifically says that it does.
[36:37.360 --> 36:46.080]  These courts are knowingly and willfully rewriting the law to suit the outcome they want, not
[36:46.080 --> 36:49.280]  what the law and justice requires.
[36:49.280 --> 36:58.200]  This is exactly why we need to document these cases and go after these judges because they
[36:58.200 --> 37:02.840]  are committing treason.
[37:02.840 --> 37:06.200]  They are violating their oath of office.
[37:06.200 --> 37:12.360]  They are doing everything that they swore they would not do if they were given the power
[37:12.360 --> 37:15.080]  of that office.
[37:15.080 --> 37:22.520]  It's fraud on top of everything else, so keep that in mind.
[37:22.520 --> 37:24.680]  Next section.
[37:24.680 --> 37:29.960]  Officers have demonstrated personal and professional ignorance of legislative and legal intent
[37:29.960 --> 37:36.440]  and purpose of speed signs and posted speed limits on Texas highways.
[37:36.440 --> 37:40.680]  As this matter pertains to respondent, these officers have knowingly and willfully violated
[37:40.680 --> 37:46.520]  respondent's protected rights and falsified a government document alleging that, one,
[37:46.520 --> 37:51.960]  respondent was acting within the legal capacity and class of persons regulated by the transportation
[37:51.960 --> 37:59.400]  code at the time of the alleged defense, and that, two, officers, the officers were lawfully
[37:59.400 --> 38:05.120]  certified and authorized to enforce provisions of the transportation code for purposes relating
[38:05.120 --> 38:09.520]  to performing a transportation or traffic stop.
[38:09.520 --> 38:14.720]  That denies this false allegation as respondent was at all times acting solely in his or her
[38:14.720 --> 38:20.080]  private common law capacity for his or her own private business and pleasure in the free
[38:20.080 --> 38:25.000]  exercise and enjoyment of his or her right to liberty through locomotion upon the public
[38:25.000 --> 38:26.840]  right of way.
[38:26.840 --> 38:32.480]  Respondent was at no time and in no way engaging in any profession or occupation relating to
[38:32.480 --> 38:38.240]  transportation nor operating or driving a commercial motor vehicle so as to even be legally
[38:38.240 --> 38:43.800]  capable of committing the alleged transportation-related offense of speeding.
[38:43.800 --> 38:47.680]  Respondent contends that it is an absolute fact that there is no evidence of the nature
[38:47.680 --> 38:52.320]  of any crimes responded as alleged to have committed, no evidence of any circumstances
[38:52.320 --> 38:57.280]  under which the alleged crimes were committed, and no evidence connecting respondent to their
[38:57.280 --> 38:58.280]  commission.
[38:58.280 --> 39:02.360]  There were states' entire premise and cases wholly presumptive and without legal substance
[39:02.360 --> 39:03.880]  of any kind.
[39:03.880 --> 39:09.160]  In this instance, the officers completely ignore or complete ignorance, misunderstanding
[39:09.160 --> 39:17.680]  and misapplication of sections 201.904 and 545.351 through 352 of the transportation code and
[39:17.680 --> 39:24.120]  section 1.03 of the Texas Penal Code coupled with said officers' absolute lack of lawfully
[39:24.120 --> 39:30.160]  delegated authority to enforce any provision whatsoever of the transportation code pursuant
[39:30.160 --> 39:37.000]  rules 4.13 and 4.14 of the administrative code has resulted in the officers illegally
[39:37.000 --> 39:43.120]  perpetrating a false warrantless seizure, arrest, and or search of respondent without
[39:43.120 --> 39:48.480]  any lawful authority, reasonable suspicion, or articulable probable cause to believe the
[39:48.480 --> 39:54.200]  existence of criminal activity under the transportation code or that respondent was actually involved
[39:54.200 --> 39:56.520]  in such activity.
[39:56.520 --> 40:02.040]  The prima facie speed limits and speed signs on Texas highways issue are the prima facie
[40:02.040 --> 40:08.680]  speed limits codified within 545.352 of the transportation code, the same numerical speed
[40:08.680 --> 40:13.080]  limits posted on the various speed signs throughout the state of Texas.
[40:13.080 --> 40:19.600]  The prima facie speed limits codified in 545.352 transportation code are the only reference
[40:19.600 --> 40:24.720]  and statute that defines lawful speed limits that respondent has been able to locate within
[40:24.720 --> 40:27.920]  the entirety of the transportation code.
[40:27.920 --> 40:32.080]  Therefore logic dictates that these are the same numerical speed limits that one would
[40:32.080 --> 40:36.400]  see posted on a speed sign along any particular public right of way.
[40:36.400 --> 40:41.520]  Those very same speed limits that are identified in section or speed signs that are identified
[40:41.520 --> 40:45.840]  in section 201.904 of the transportation code.
[40:45.840 --> 40:50.600]  Respondent demands the court take judicial notice of section 201.904 of the transportation
[40:50.600 --> 40:52.480]  code in its entirety.
[40:52.480 --> 40:57.680]  Then of course if we read section 201.904 this is how it reads.
[40:57.680 --> 41:00.800]  It's titled speed signs.
[41:00.800 --> 41:06.960]  Then it reads the department meaning the department of transportation in this case shall erect
[41:06.960 --> 41:12.760]  and maintain on the highways and roads of this state appropriate signs that show the
[41:12.760 --> 41:16.320]  maximum lawful speed for.
[41:16.320 --> 41:22.360]  And then it tells us exactly what vehicles it applies to as far as the speed sign goes.
[41:22.360 --> 41:31.240]  Commercial motor vehicles, truck tractors, truck trailers, truck semi trailers and motor
[41:31.240 --> 41:38.840]  vehicles engaged in the business of transporting passengers for compensation or hire and in
[41:38.840 --> 41:43.920]  parentheses it says buses.
[41:43.920 --> 41:53.760]  Should not be any clearer what the limitation of a posted speed sign is in relation to speed
[41:53.760 --> 41:56.640]  limits.
[41:56.640 --> 42:01.880]  Respondent contends that the language of section 201.904 transportation code is extremely clear
[42:01.880 --> 42:07.880]  and unambiguous that the only legitimate and legal purpose of all speed signs throughout
[42:07.880 --> 42:17.360]  Texas is to display the regulated maximum prima facie speed limit that an operator of
[42:17.360 --> 42:24.120]  one of the specific classifications of commercial motor vehicles listed therein is allowed to
[42:24.120 --> 42:29.280]  travel upon that portion of the highway.
[42:29.280 --> 42:34.320]  The court is not free to interpret the language of the statute to encompass what is clearly
[42:34.320 --> 42:41.320]  not present in its terms and must apply it as written and enacted by the legislature without
[42:41.320 --> 42:54.640]  consideration for what the court may perceive as a legislative mistake by omission.
[42:54.640 --> 43:01.320]  The language of section 201.904 transportation code clearly eliminates the possibility of
[43:01.320 --> 43:08.080]  the posted speed limit signs along any Texas roadway as being applicable to any private
[43:08.080 --> 43:13.520]  conveyance by specifically identifying its purpose and application to regulate the speed
[43:13.520 --> 43:19.120]  of various types of commercial motor vehicles and nothing more.
[43:19.120 --> 43:21.160]  Then we get into the case law.
[43:21.160 --> 43:27.040]  Unless the statute is ambiguous, we must follow the clear language of the statute.
[43:27.040 --> 43:33.320]  This principle is set forth in a number of Texas cases and that's Republic-Bank Dallas
[43:33.320 --> 43:34.320]  NA versus InterCal.
[43:34.320 --> 43:39.880]  All right, folks, we'll continue this on when we get back on the other side so y'all
[43:39.880 --> 43:41.040]  hang in there.
[43:41.040 --> 43:46.000]  Again, the phones are off until I get done with this presentation and then we will turn
[43:46.000 --> 43:47.000]  them on.
[43:47.000 --> 43:50.520]  Also, don't forget about the fundraiser that is still ongoing.
[43:50.520 --> 43:56.480]  Please go to LogosRadioNetwork.com and donate whatever you can as often as you can.
[43:56.480 --> 43:57.480]  Hang on there.
[43:57.480 --> 44:27.440]  We'll be right back.
[44:57.480 --> 45:09.240]  Hello, my name is Stuart Smith from naturespureorganics.com and I would like to invite you to come
[45:09.240 --> 45:14.760]  by our store at 1904 Guadalupe Street, Sweet D here in Austin, Texas, find brave new books
[45:14.760 --> 45:18.200]  and chase things to see all our fantastic health and wellness products with your very
[45:18.200 --> 45:19.200]  own eyes.
[45:19.200 --> 45:24.040]  Have a look at our miracle healing clay that started our adventure in alternative medicine.
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[45:44.640 --> 46:02.000]  Don't forget to like us on Facebook for information on events and our products naturespureorganics.com.
[46:02.000 --> 46:30.120]  Alright folks, we are back, this is Rule of Law Radio Monday Night Show with your host
[46:30.120 --> 46:35.320]  Eddie Craig and continuing on with the reading of the pleaded jurisdiction motion from the
[46:35.320 --> 46:41.240]  article on the legal blog dealing with the notice to appear scam.
[46:41.240 --> 46:46.320]  Second case, a fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain
[46:46.320 --> 46:52.320]  the intent of the legislature as expressed in the language of that statute at state versus
[46:52.320 --> 47:00.160]  tarot, 588-SW 2nd, 784-786, Texas 1979.
[47:00.160 --> 47:07.080]  Unless a statute is ambiguous, we must follow the clear language of the statute, again Republic
[47:07.080 --> 47:14.360]  Bank, then Gonzales versus Signa Insurance Company, and so on and so forth.
[47:14.360 --> 47:20.280]  Our role in statutory construction is merely to give effect to the legislature's intent
[47:20.280 --> 47:26.160]  by examining the plain meaning of the statute, City of Round Rock versus Rodriguez, citing
[47:26.160 --> 47:28.880]  Molina versus Kimball.
[47:28.880 --> 47:34.520]  It is the legislature's prerogative to enact statutes, it is the judiciary's responsibility
[47:34.520 --> 47:40.120]  to interpret those statutes according to the language the legislature used, citing
[47:40.120 --> 47:42.240]  Shea versus Hall.
[47:42.240 --> 47:47.000]  While this court may properly write in areas traditionally reserved to the judicial branch
[47:47.000 --> 47:52.520]  of government, it would be a usurpation of our powers to add language to a law where
[47:52.520 --> 47:58.760]  the legislature has refrained, Carter versus Harris County appraisal district.
[47:58.760 --> 48:03.920]  So clearly the courts are not free to remove or insert additional requirements, subjects
[48:03.920 --> 48:09.880]  or objects, or impart additional authority to the magistrate or other court in relation
[48:09.880 --> 48:14.680]  to the aforementioned statutes and the classes of misdemeanors or legislative subject and
[48:14.680 --> 48:22.800]  objects that those statutes do not specifically or even referentially impart in their language.
[48:22.800 --> 48:29.240]  Based upon the entirely unambiguous language of Section 201.904, these officers could not
[48:29.240 --> 48:35.000]  have possibly had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that respond that
[48:35.000 --> 48:40.320]  was in a commercial motor vehicle, so as to be guilty of criminal conduct in the form
[48:40.320 --> 48:50.960]  of speeding, okay, sorry, I'm making slight corrections as we go here just so I can make
[48:50.960 --> 48:55.960]  sure that this is correct and I'll put an update on the blog later.
[48:55.960 --> 49:00.640]  So also on the blog, you'll notice above each of the two documents in that article,
[49:00.640 --> 49:05.560]  there is a label telling you when that particular embedded document was last updated.
[49:05.560 --> 49:11.720]  I would suggest that when you save a copy of that document, you put that date and time
[49:11.720 --> 49:15.960]  into the file name so that you can always look at the file directly and then at the
[49:15.960 --> 49:22.040]  website and see if the copy you have is the most current from what we've got posted.
[49:22.040 --> 49:29.440]  Okay, now, so as to be guilty of the charge of speeding, therefore the officers cannot
[49:29.440 --> 49:35.520]  reasonably assert that they merely made an honest mistake of law when they decided and
[49:35.520 --> 49:40.920]  acted to initiate an unlawful and illegal warrantless seizure, arrest, and or search
[49:40.920 --> 49:44.120]  of respondent for the alleged defense.
[49:44.120 --> 49:51.360]  There was no mistaking the fact that respondent was not operating any classification of vehicle
[49:51.360 --> 49:57.840]  that could be even remotely mistaken for a commercial motor vehicle, truck tractor,
[49:57.840 --> 50:03.160]  truck trailer, truck semi trailer, or a motor vehicle engaged in the business of transporting
[50:03.160 --> 50:06.640]  passengers for compensation or hire meaning buses.
[50:06.640 --> 50:10.240]  We're using the language of the statute, folks.
[50:10.240 --> 50:16.560]  The language itself eliminates the possibility of that officer ever having had probable cause
[50:16.560 --> 50:20.760]  or even reasonable suspicion at a minimum.
[50:20.760 --> 50:27.920]  It was a bad stop, no yes, no ands, no buts.
[50:27.920 --> 50:33.240]  As previously stated, respondent can find no other legal authority that identifies an
[50:33.240 --> 50:39.400]  alternative regulatory purpose for the prima facie speed limits posted on all speed signs
[50:39.400 --> 50:44.920]  throughout the state of Texas and without it, this traffic stop by these officers was
[50:44.920 --> 50:50.400]  entirely without authority in law or statute, making the initial seizure, arrest, and or
[50:50.400 --> 50:56.280]  search of respondent and respondent's private conveyance entirely unconstitutional and illegal.
[50:56.280 --> 51:02.040]  Issue, what does prima facie speed limits actually mean?
[51:02.040 --> 51:06.440]  Respondent has found the following legal definitions for the legal term of art prima facie, which
[51:06.440 --> 51:12.800]  means prima facie, the first blush, the first view or appearance of the business as the
[51:12.800 --> 51:20.560]  holder of a bill of exchange endorsed in blank is prima facie its owner, as Bouviets in 1839,
[51:20.560 --> 51:27.840]  volume 2, page 293, prima facie, the first blush, the first view or appearance of the
[51:27.840 --> 51:33.360]  business as the holder of bill or exchange endorsed in blank is prima facie its owner.
[51:33.360 --> 51:37.400]  Now there's a second definition.
[51:37.400 --> 51:45.520]  Prima facie evidence of fact is in law sufficient to establish the fact unless rebutted.
[51:45.520 --> 51:52.380]  That's exactly what we've done is we have rebutted the prima facie speed limit requirements.
[51:52.380 --> 51:56.200]  The state has no defense against this.
[51:56.200 --> 52:01.040]  The only thing it can do is simply gloss over the fact and make it appear as if they're
[52:01.040 --> 52:09.840]  still acting validly when in fact the statute plainly shows they are not.
[52:09.840 --> 52:11.040]  Let's see.
[52:11.040 --> 52:15.920]  For example, when buildings are fired by sparks and emitted from a locomotive engine passing
[52:15.920 --> 52:20.360]  along the road, it is prima facie evidence of negligence on part of those who have the
[52:20.360 --> 52:23.520]  charge of it, meaning the locomotive.
[52:23.520 --> 52:30.760]  Prima facie at first sight, on the first appearance, on the face of it, so far as can be a judge
[52:30.760 --> 52:36.640]  from the first disclosure, presumably a fact presumed to be true unless disproved by some
[52:36.640 --> 52:39.920]  evidence to the contrary, okay?
[52:39.920 --> 52:46.520]  State versus X-Rail, or State X-Rail Herbert versus WIMS, all right?
[52:46.520 --> 52:52.440]  That is the definition used by Black's Law Sixth Edition on page 1189 is the definition
[52:52.440 --> 52:56.520]  from State X-Rail Herbert versus WIMS.
[52:56.520 --> 53:01.640]  For the purposes of this discourse, respondent shall utilize the third listed definition
[53:01.640 --> 53:06.520]  as found in Black's Law Dictionary Sixth Edition, page 1189.
[53:06.520 --> 53:10.520]  For this definition of prima facie, we can conclude the following about prima facie
[53:10.520 --> 53:17.640]  speed limits according to the language of 545.352 transportation code, which is that
[53:17.640 --> 53:23.680]  at first sight or appearance, the facts would appear to show on their face that the numerical
[53:23.680 --> 53:30.400]  speed limit posted on all Texas speed signs is merely presumed at first sight to be the
[53:30.400 --> 53:36.280]  maximum reasonable and prudent speed at which that portion of the public right of way may
[53:36.280 --> 53:43.040]  be safely traveled unless the presumption is disproved by some evidence to the contrary.
[53:43.040 --> 53:49.840]  Therefore, the question now is, what would constitute such other relevant facts or evidence
[53:49.840 --> 53:53.520]  for the purpose of rebutting this presumption?
[53:53.520 --> 53:57.600]  Respondent contends that these other relevant and rebutting facts are actually codified
[53:57.600 --> 54:04.760]  within the provisions of section 545.351 of the transportation code, which reads maximum
[54:04.760 --> 54:11.400]  speed requirement, subsection A. An operator, there it is again.
[54:11.400 --> 54:18.560]  The person must be an operator in order for the statute to apply, period.
[54:18.560 --> 54:21.640]  There is no driver here.
[54:21.640 --> 54:27.480]  It must state both in the allegation in the complaint and any other charging instrument
[54:27.480 --> 54:34.720]  that the person was an operator of a motor vehicle, okay?
[54:34.720 --> 54:37.360]  Our commercial motor vehicle in this case.
[54:37.360 --> 54:40.840]  Now an operator may not drive.
[54:40.840 --> 54:44.520]  Now here it's saying drive, but they're an operator.
[54:44.520 --> 54:50.720]  The term drive itself is defined in only one chapter of the transportation code.
[54:50.720 --> 55:01.720]  That is in chapter 521.022, which is commercial driver's licenses, okay?
[55:01.720 --> 55:09.880]  521.021, I'm sorry, chapter 522, not section 521.022.
[55:09.880 --> 55:11.960]  Chapter 522 is commercial driver's licenses.
[55:11.960 --> 55:16.240]  Chapter 521 is other driver's licenses, which are still commercial, but not specifically
[55:16.240 --> 55:19.280]  identified as commercial, all right?
[55:19.280 --> 55:26.280]  So that being said, at a speed that is greater than reasonable and prudent under the circumstances
[55:26.280 --> 55:27.800]  then existing.
[55:27.800 --> 55:37.360]  So it must be an operator who is driving according to the code, all right?
[55:37.360 --> 55:45.880]  Now subsection B, notice that everything in A is completely subjective if A stands by
[55:45.880 --> 55:47.120]  itself.
[55:47.120 --> 55:53.400]  So if they're citing subsection A on the charging instrument as the statute they're basing
[55:53.400 --> 55:59.800]  this on, you must always object to it because subsection A is highly ambiguous and completely
[55:59.800 --> 56:02.120]  subjective as to what it means.
[56:02.120 --> 56:08.720]  Again, greater than is reasonable and prudent according to who and what facts and circumstances,
[56:08.720 --> 56:11.920]  what criteria determines what is reasonable and prudent.
[56:11.920 --> 56:17.680]  Then it also says under the circumstances then existing, but it doesn't identify what
[56:17.680 --> 56:21.840]  those circumstances that are required are.
[56:21.840 --> 56:29.280]  So subsection A by itself is void because it is so vague and ambiguous and so highly
[56:29.280 --> 56:35.760]  subjective as to make the entire statute completely susceptible to officer interpretation
[56:35.760 --> 56:39.400]  in any way they want.
[56:39.400 --> 56:45.400]  So they can't use subsection A by itself or the complaint is invalid and the charge is
[56:45.400 --> 56:49.360]  invalid just on vague and ambiguous alone.
[56:49.360 --> 56:58.640]  So subsection B, an operator again with the operator, sub-item one of subsection B, may
[56:58.640 --> 57:04.680]  not drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions
[57:04.680 --> 57:10.000]  and having regard for actual and potential hazards then existing.
[57:10.000 --> 57:18.120]  Now remember that the posted speed limit applies only to commercial motor vehicles, but right
[57:18.120 --> 57:25.920]  here the statute is trying to disguise that fact by stating vehicle alone as if it applies
[57:25.920 --> 57:35.800]  to any vehicle, but we know that cannot be true because everything in 351 is based upon
[57:35.800 --> 57:41.000]  a reasonable and prudent speed as determined by 352, which we've already determined is
[57:41.000 --> 57:47.520]  the same speed limit posted on the speed sign established by 201.904.
[57:47.520 --> 57:56.200]  So vehicle here must be commercial motor vehicle, it can't be anything else and be consistent
[57:56.200 --> 57:59.680]  with the other statutes on this subject.
[57:59.680 --> 58:06.560]  This is obfuscation, intentional obfuscation of the specific purpose of this statute, but
[58:06.560 --> 58:12.360]  we will continue on and we will unravel it and we will make it very clear why we can
[58:12.360 --> 58:13.360]  rebut it.
[58:13.360 --> 58:17.120]  All right folks, y'all hang in there, we will be back here in just a minute.
[58:17.120 --> 58:20.760]  This should be our top of the hour break, so we're going to be gone in about four minutes,
[58:20.760 --> 58:50.520]  but we will return, y'all hang on and we will be right back.
[58:50.520 --> 58:55.960]  The Bible remains the most popular book in the world, yet countless readers are frustrated
[58:55.960 --> 58:58.760]  because they struggle to understand it.
[58:58.760 --> 59:04.160]  Some new translations try to help by simplifying the text, but in the process can compromise
[59:04.160 --> 59:07.400]  the profound meaning of the Scripture.
[59:07.400 --> 59:09.200]  Enter the recovery version.
[59:09.200 --> 59:15.080]  First, this new translation is extremely faithful and accurate, but the real story is the more
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[59:21.880 --> 59:27.080]  way, providing an entrance into the riches of the word beyond which you've ever experienced
[59:27.080 --> 59:28.080]  before.
[59:28.080 --> 59:33.680]  Bibles for America would like to give you a free recovery version simply for the asking.
[59:33.680 --> 59:44.120]  This comprehensive yet compact study Bible is yours just by calling us toll free at 1-888-551-0102
[59:44.120 --> 59:47.960]  or by ordering online at freestudybible.com.
[59:47.960 --> 59:49.960]  That's freestudybible.com.
[59:49.960 --> 01:00:01.000]  You are listening to the Logos Radio Network, LogosRadioNetwork.com.
[01:00:01.000 --> 01:00:05.640]  The following news flash is brought to you by The Low Star Lowdown.
[01:00:05.640 --> 01:00:11.800]  Markets for Wednesday the 26th of July 2017 are currently trading with gold at $1,260.75
[01:00:11.800 --> 01:00:19.080]  amounts, silver $16.69 amounts, Texas crude $47.89 a barrel, and Bitcoin is sitting a
[01:00:19.080 --> 01:00:22.880]  little over $2,474 US currency.
[01:00:22.880 --> 01:00:30.920]  Today in history, the year 1938, an unprecedented swarm of grasshoppers descends on crops throughout
[01:00:30.920 --> 01:00:34.080]  the American heartland, devastating millions of acres.
[01:00:34.080 --> 01:00:38.880]  Iowa, Nebraska, and South Dakota, already in the midst of a bad drought, suffered the
[01:00:38.880 --> 01:00:46.960]  most from this grasshopper disaster today in history.
[01:00:46.960 --> 01:00:47.960]  And recent news.
[01:00:47.960 --> 01:00:51.800]  Yesterday, Tuesday, police chiefs from three of the five biggest cities in the state spoke
[01:00:51.800 --> 01:00:56.200]  out at the Texas Capitol against the transgender bathroom bill being considered by the Republican
[01:00:56.200 --> 01:01:01.560]  legislator as discriminatory and in divergence of resources that won't keep people safe.
[01:01:01.560 --> 01:01:05.880]  The police chiefs were joined by public school officials, advocates for sexual assault survivors,
[01:01:05.880 --> 01:01:09.960]  representatives from the Harris County and El Paso Sheriff's offices, the Corpus Christi
[01:01:09.960 --> 01:01:12.600]  ISD chief of police and others.
[01:01:12.600 --> 01:01:17.360]  The main issue, as Austin police chief Brian Manley put it, is that if, quote, a bill like
[01:01:17.360 --> 01:01:22.000]  this were to be passed, that would pull police officers' time away from combating violent
[01:01:22.000 --> 01:01:27.360]  crime into enforcing a bathroom bill, it makes communities less safe, since it is time not
[01:01:27.360 --> 01:01:29.720]  spent ensuring community safety.
[01:01:29.720 --> 01:01:33.400]  The legislation would restrict bathroom use in schools and local government buildings
[01:01:33.400 --> 01:01:37.720]  by superseding and nullifying parts of local non-discrimination ordinances meant to allow
[01:01:37.720 --> 01:01:42.600]  transgender residents, which make up less than 1% of the population, the claim to use
[01:01:42.600 --> 01:01:44.600]  the public bathroom of their choice.
[01:01:44.600 --> 01:01:47.200]  The bill did pass just after midnight last night.
[01:01:47.200 --> 01:01:56.240]  The Senate voted 21 to 10, and it now goes to the House for consideration.
[01:01:56.240 --> 01:02:00.800]  An information technology staffer for former chairwoman of the Democratic National Committee,
[01:02:00.800 --> 01:02:05.640]  Representative Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Democrat from Florida, Imran Awan, a 37-year-old, was
[01:02:05.640 --> 01:02:10.560]  arrested on Monday by FBI agents and U.S. Capitol Police at Dolly's International Airport
[01:02:10.560 --> 01:02:13.240]  while attempting to flee to Lahore, Pakistan.
[01:02:13.240 --> 01:02:17.120]  He was charged with bank fraud in the U.S. District Court on Tuesday, where he pleaded
[01:02:17.120 --> 01:02:18.440]  not guilty.
[01:02:18.440 --> 01:02:22.440]  According to federal court documents, officials are accusing Awan and his wife, Kena Avi, of
[01:02:22.440 --> 01:02:27.720]  defrauding the Congressional Federal Credit Union of $165,000 by lying on a home equity
[01:02:27.720 --> 01:02:32.440]  loan application and not listing the home that they were getting the loan for as a rental
[01:02:32.440 --> 01:02:33.440]  property.
[01:02:33.440 --> 01:02:37.840]  Awan was released and is under a high-intensity supervision program with his hearing scheduled
[01:02:37.840 --> 01:02:39.440]  for the 21st of August.
[01:02:39.440 --> 01:02:44.080]  Awan's lawyer Christopher Gowen said that the charges are politically motivated and
[01:02:44.080 --> 01:02:50.280]  quote, began as part of a frenzy of anti-Muslim bigotry in the literal heart of our democracy,
[01:02:50.280 --> 01:02:51.280]  the House of Representatives.
[01:02:51.280 --> 01:02:58.280]  This is Rick Crowley with your loadout for July 26, 2017.
[01:04:21.280 --> 01:04:35.280]  I live back in the woods, you see, a woman and the kids and the dogs and me.
[01:04:35.280 --> 01:04:41.280]  I got a shotgun, a rifle and a four-wheel drive and a country boy can't survive.
[01:04:41.280 --> 01:04:50.280]  Country folks can't survive.
[01:04:50.280 --> 01:04:53.080]  I can fly a field all day long.
[01:04:53.080 --> 01:05:04.280]  I can catch catfish from dust till dawn, make our own whiskey and our own smoke, too.
[01:05:04.280 --> 01:05:08.280]  Ain't too many things these old boys can't do.
[01:05:08.280 --> 01:05:19.280]  The growth of old tomatoes and homemade wine and country boy can't survive.
[01:05:19.280 --> 01:05:21.280]  Country folks can't survive.
[01:05:21.280 --> 01:05:23.280]  All right, folks, we are back.
[01:05:23.280 --> 01:05:25.280]  This is rule of law radio.
[01:05:25.280 --> 01:05:27.280]  All right, continuing on.
[01:05:27.280 --> 01:05:31.280]  I'm not going to read the rest of the statute here because it's in the documents you can
[01:05:31.280 --> 01:05:32.280]  figure it out.
[01:05:32.280 --> 01:05:35.280]  I want to get into the argument more than I want to get into the statute.
[01:05:35.280 --> 01:05:42.280]  But needless to say, when you read through A and B, it points us down to C as to what
[01:05:42.280 --> 01:05:48.280]  applies when it comes to circumstances, conditions and hazards potentially existing at the time.
[01:05:48.280 --> 01:05:56.280]  And that, too, is a very limited list of things, all of which the state would be required to
[01:05:56.280 --> 01:06:01.280]  assert in a criminal allegation for speeding but never does.
[01:06:01.280 --> 01:06:07.280]  They never assert any of this in the allegation, which means every speeding conviction they've
[01:06:07.280 --> 01:06:13.280]  gotten has been gotten by denying the right of notice and due process to the individual
[01:06:13.280 --> 01:06:15.280]  they've charged.
[01:06:15.280 --> 01:06:17.280]  There's no way around that.
[01:06:17.280 --> 01:06:25.280]  Every speeding ticket in Texas has been prosecuted under fraudulent conditions.
[01:06:25.280 --> 01:06:28.280]  Every last one of them.
[01:06:28.280 --> 01:06:30.280]  Okay?
[01:06:30.280 --> 01:06:38.280]  Now, however, respondent also contends that sections 545.351A and B of the transportation
[01:06:38.280 --> 01:06:45.280]  code are potentially unconstitutional in that they are vague and ambiguous by being entirely
[01:06:45.280 --> 01:06:50.280]  arbitrary and subjective as to what constitutes reasonable and prudent in accordance with the
[01:06:50.280 --> 01:06:54.280]  circumstances, conditions or potential hazards then existing.
[01:06:54.280 --> 01:07:00.280]  The only way to avoid this issue of the statute being vague and ambiguous is by both applying
[01:07:00.280 --> 01:07:05.280]  and limiting the interpretation of these undefined portions of the statute to the provisions of
[01:07:05.280 --> 01:07:12.280]  sections or section 545.351C transportation code.
[01:07:12.280 --> 01:07:17.280]  But not one of these terms or phrases is defined anywhere within the transportation code.
[01:07:17.280 --> 01:07:24.280]  Therefore, an officer, prosecutor or judge is completely free to arbitrarily and subjectively
[01:07:24.280 --> 01:07:32.280]  create any scenario that they wish and apply it to the, to alleged offense by assigning their
[01:07:32.280 --> 01:07:37.280]  own interpretations to these undefined and highly subjective terms and phrases.
[01:07:37.280 --> 01:07:44.280]  Allowing such arbitrary and subjective interpretations of law by agents of the state is patently
[01:07:44.280 --> 01:07:46.280]  unconstitutional.
[01:07:46.280 --> 01:07:53.280]  And then we have the case of screws versus United States 325 US 91 from 1945 where it reads.
[01:07:53.280 --> 01:07:59.280]  In United States versus Coen Grocery Company, an act of Congress was struck down, the enforcement
[01:07:59.280 --> 01:08:04.280]  of which would have been the exact equivalent of an effort to carry out a statute which in
[01:08:04.280 --> 01:08:10.280]  terms merely penalized and punished all acts detrimental to public interest when unjust
[01:08:10.280 --> 01:08:14.280]  and unreasonable in the estimation of the court and jury.
[01:08:14.280 --> 01:08:20.280]  In that case, the act declared criminal was the making of any unjust or unreasonable rate
[01:08:20.280 --> 01:08:26.280]  or charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries.
[01:08:26.280 --> 01:08:36.280]  255 US page 86, the act contained no definition of an unjust or unreasonable rate nor did it
[01:08:36.280 --> 01:08:43.280]  refer to any source where the measure of unjust or unreasonable could be ascertained.
[01:08:43.280 --> 01:08:48.280]  Therein, ladies and gentlemen, is the case that makes the very argument I'm trying to
[01:08:48.280 --> 01:08:55.280]  make when they don't specifically define what circumstances, conditions or potential hazards
[01:08:55.280 --> 01:08:59.280]  and what constitutes reasonable and prudent in the statute.
[01:08:59.280 --> 01:09:05.280]  That statute is vague and ambiguous and completely unenforceable because it is completely subjective
[01:09:05.280 --> 01:09:11.280]  and subject to interpretation of the officer, the court or anyone else.
[01:09:11.280 --> 01:09:19.280]  Okay, so that being said, this case supports our argument that they can't do that.
[01:09:19.280 --> 01:09:27.280]  Thus, the argument that what's listed in subsection C of 545.351 is the only way to avoid that
[01:09:27.280 --> 01:09:33.280]  vague and ambiguous unconstitutionality by limiting the application of all of those terms
[01:09:33.280 --> 01:09:40.280]  to what is specifically listed in subsection C but is not specifically stated as being
[01:09:40.280 --> 01:09:44.280]  relevant to these particular terms.
[01:09:44.280 --> 01:09:51.280]  But it does tell us subsection C and operators shall consistent with subsections A and B,
[01:09:51.280 --> 01:09:56.280]  drive at an appropriate reduced speed if and then it goes into all these circumstances
[01:09:56.280 --> 01:09:59.280]  and conditions where the reduced speed is necessary.
[01:09:59.280 --> 01:10:06.280]  So you see, the statute works but the state actors don't use it.
[01:10:06.280 --> 01:10:11.280]  They do what they want instead of what the statute requires.
[01:10:11.280 --> 01:10:16.280]  Now we get into the next section. Where is the legal authority required to apply
[01:10:16.280 --> 01:10:21.280]  prima facie speed limits and speed signs to the general non-commercial traveling public?
[01:10:21.280 --> 01:10:28.280]  The legal issue asked is, where is the legal authority found within the transportation code
[01:10:28.280 --> 01:10:34.280]  that makes the numerical speed limit posted on all speed signs applicable to a private individual
[01:10:34.280 --> 01:10:39.280]  traveling in their private conveyance rather than only to those who are professionally
[01:10:39.280 --> 01:10:46.280]  engaged in transportation as a driver or operator of a class of commercial motor vehicles
[01:10:46.280 --> 01:10:52.280]  specifically identified in sections 201.904 transportation code.
[01:10:52.280 --> 01:10:59.280]  Respondent has read section 201.904 transportation code in its entirety a multitude of times
[01:10:59.280 --> 01:11:06.280]  and can find absolutely no reference or inference to any form of private non-commercial conveyance
[01:11:06.280 --> 01:11:12.280]  or vehicle as being the regulatory focus of either the speed sign or the numerical speed limit
[01:11:12.280 --> 01:11:14.280]  posted on said sign.
[01:11:14.280 --> 01:11:19.280]  Furthermore, Respondent has searched the entirety of the transportation code thoroughly
[01:11:19.280 --> 01:11:26.280]  and has been unable to locate any similar statute that identifies some other type or form of speed sign
[01:11:26.280 --> 01:11:31.280]  that allegedly regulates the speed of private individuals and or private conveyances.
[01:11:31.280 --> 01:11:37.280]  Therefore, Respondent would ask by what authority the Texas courts and law enforcement agencies
[01:11:37.280 --> 01:11:44.280]  continue to read into the law or statute an application to persons and property which is not at all stated
[01:11:44.280 --> 01:11:51.280]  or inferred by what appears to be extremely clear and unambiguous language regarding what vehicles
[01:11:51.280 --> 01:11:54.280]  are actually subject to the posted speed limits.
[01:11:54.280 --> 01:11:59.280]  Nor can Respondent determine by what authority the Texas courts presume to rewrite the
[01:11:59.280 --> 01:12:04.280]  imperimaterial language of these statutes by mere interpretive opinion,
[01:12:04.280 --> 01:12:10.280]  especially in a manner that expands the legislature's regulatory purpose and application of the statute,
[01:12:10.280 --> 01:12:17.280]  much less by what authority the courts refuse to recognize and adhere to what is clearly written therein.
[01:12:17.280 --> 01:12:21.280]  Are the courts bound by the law as it is written or not?
[01:12:21.280 --> 01:12:27.280]  The court opinion cited Supra all say absolutely and unequivocally yes,
[01:12:27.280 --> 01:12:32.280]  for unless the law or state is determined to be unconstitutional,
[01:12:32.280 --> 01:12:40.280]  then there is no authority that resides in the courts to create or rewrite the law into something
[01:12:40.280 --> 01:12:44.280]  that does not exist within the clear terms of its language,
[01:12:44.280 --> 01:12:50.280]  as anything else is itself a completely unconstitutional exercise of legislative authority
[01:12:50.280 --> 01:12:53.280]  from the bench by those very courts.
[01:12:53.280 --> 01:12:59.280]  Where is the legal authority required to enforce prima facie speed limits and speed signs
[01:12:59.280 --> 01:13:03.280]  against the general noncommercial traveling public?
[01:13:03.280 --> 01:13:08.280]  Where is the legal authority found within the transportation code
[01:13:08.280 --> 01:13:14.280]  authorizing the enforcement of the numerical speed limit posted on all speed signs
[01:13:14.280 --> 01:13:19.280]  against a private individual traveling in their private conveyance
[01:13:19.280 --> 01:13:24.280]  rather than only to those who are professionally or occupationally engaged in transportation
[01:13:24.280 --> 01:13:28.280]  as a driver or operator of a class of commercial motor vehicle
[01:13:28.280 --> 01:13:33.280]  specifically identified in section 201.904 transportation code.
[01:13:33.280 --> 01:13:37.280]  According to 201.904 transportation code,
[01:13:37.280 --> 01:13:42.280]  the only types of vehicles that are statutorily regulated by any and all posted speed signs
[01:13:42.280 --> 01:13:47.280]  and the maximal speed limit posted thereon throughout the entire state of Texas
[01:13:47.280 --> 01:13:51.280]  are entirely and strictly commercial use vehicles.
[01:13:51.280 --> 01:13:56.280]  There is no other statute to be found that applies the prima facie speed limits
[01:13:56.280 --> 01:14:02.280]  to private individuals and their private noncommercial use conveyances of any kind.
[01:14:02.280 --> 01:14:07.280]  This is not to say that private noncommercial use travelers are free to act negligently
[01:14:07.280 --> 01:14:11.280]  or recklessly in their travels upon the public right of way
[01:14:11.280 --> 01:14:16.280]  so as to present a clear and imminent danger to any other private travelers or vehicles
[01:14:16.280 --> 01:14:19.280]  that might also be upon the public right of way.
[01:14:19.280 --> 01:14:25.280]  But it is to say that the transportation code is not properly and legally applicable to anyone
[01:14:25.280 --> 01:14:30.280]  other than the specific class of legal persons who use the public highways to engage
[01:14:30.280 --> 01:14:37.280]  in the professional occupation of transportation as operators or drivers of commercial motor vehicles
[01:14:37.280 --> 01:14:41.280]  including but not limited to any allegation of speeding.
[01:14:41.280 --> 01:14:46.280]  Next section, statutes relating to speeding prima facie speed limits and speed signs
[01:14:46.280 --> 01:14:49.280]  must be read and interpreted in paramateria.
[01:14:49.280 --> 01:14:56.280]  Issue by what lawful authority do Texas courts refuse to read and apply sections 201.904
[01:14:56.280 --> 01:15:02.280]  and 545.351 through 352 of the transportation code as being in paramateria
[01:15:02.280 --> 01:15:07.280]  and completely legally inseparable from the interrelated legislative objects
[01:15:07.280 --> 01:15:11.280]  of speed signs, speed limits and speeding.
[01:15:11.280 --> 01:15:16.280]  Respondent can fathom no legally coherent and valid means by which the Texas courts
[01:15:16.280 --> 01:15:22.280]  and law enforcement agencies may arbitrarily separate and treat as being wholly unrelated
[01:15:22.280 --> 01:15:29.280]  the provisions of sections 201.904, 545.351 through 352 of the transportation code
[01:15:29.280 --> 01:15:35.280]  as even the most rudimentary logic would prove in refute any such claim as being totally inconsistent
[01:15:35.280 --> 01:15:38.280]  with the interdependencies of the statutes themselves.
[01:15:38.280 --> 01:15:43.280]  The interdependencies should be obvious to all who make the effort to read and understand the statutes
[01:15:43.280 --> 01:15:44.280]  as a required whole.
[01:15:44.280 --> 01:15:52.280]  In that one, as 545.352 transportation code defines what are to be considered the prima facie speed limits
[01:15:52.280 --> 01:15:57.280]  by specifically designating what the default maximal speed shall be on any particular type
[01:15:57.280 --> 01:16:01.280]  or part of the public right of way throughout the state of Texas
[01:16:01.280 --> 01:16:06.280]  by one of these particular classes of commercial motor vehicle, the particular classes
[01:16:06.280 --> 01:16:11.280]  of commercial motor vehicle designated by section 201.904 transportation code
[01:16:11.280 --> 01:16:18.280]  and the maximum lawful speed limits identified by section 545.352 transportation code
[01:16:18.280 --> 01:16:23.280]  are actually the same numerical speed limits that are displayed on the individual speed signs
[01:16:23.280 --> 01:16:27.280]  defined by section 201.904 transportation code
[01:16:27.280 --> 01:16:33.280]  and how is it to be legally determined that an operator fell to maintain and control his or her speed
[01:16:33.280 --> 01:16:40.280]  within the numerical speed limit identified by section 545.352
[01:16:40.280 --> 01:16:47.280]  and displayed on the posted speed sign identified by 201.904 upon that specific part of the public right of way
[01:16:47.280 --> 01:16:51.280]  so as to be unable to avoid a collision with another person or vehicle.
[01:16:51.280 --> 01:16:53.280]  I'll finish this up on the other side, folks.
[01:16:53.280 --> 01:16:58.280]  Y'all hang on and we will be right back.
[01:17:24.280 --> 01:17:27.280]  Whenever you order anything from Amazon, you can help Logos
[01:17:27.280 --> 01:17:29.280]  with ordering your supplies or holiday gifts.
[01:17:29.280 --> 01:17:31.280]  First thing you do is clear your cookies.
[01:17:31.280 --> 01:17:34.280]  Now go to www.logosregulatework.com.
[01:17:34.280 --> 01:17:37.280]  Click on the Amazon logo and bookmark it.
[01:17:37.280 --> 01:17:43.280]  Now when you order anything from Amazon, you use that link and Logos gets a few pesos.
[01:17:43.280 --> 01:17:44.280]  Do I pay extra?
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[01:17:45.280 --> 01:17:47.280]  Do you have to do anything different when I order?
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[01:17:48.280 --> 01:17:49.280]  Can I use my Amazon Prime?
[01:17:49.280 --> 01:17:50.280]  No.
[01:17:50.280 --> 01:17:51.280]  I mean yes.
[01:17:51.280 --> 01:17:54.280]  Wow. Giving without doing anything or spending any money.
[01:17:54.280 --> 01:17:55.280]  This is perfect.
[01:17:55.280 --> 01:17:57.280]  Thank you so much.
[01:17:57.280 --> 01:17:58.280]  We are Logos.
[01:17:58.280 --> 01:18:22.280]  Happy Holidays, Logos!
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[01:19:28.280 --> 01:19:37.280]  Hi, folks.
[01:19:37.280 --> 01:19:42.280]  I'm going to pick up number three again from where I left off.
[01:19:42.280 --> 01:19:47.280]  One more time before I continue, please go to the LogosRadioNetwork.com.
[01:19:47.280 --> 01:19:51.280]  Look at the fundraiser information in the top left-hand corner of the main page.
[01:19:51.280 --> 01:19:53.280]  If you haven't, please donate.
[01:19:53.280 --> 01:19:56.280]  If you have, please consider donating again.
[01:19:56.280 --> 01:20:01.280]  If you don't have a copy of the traffic seminar, you might want to consider getting it if you
[01:20:01.280 --> 01:20:02.280]  live in Texas.
[01:20:02.280 --> 01:20:08.280]  And just remember that most state statutory schemes are fairly similar across the board.
[01:20:08.280 --> 01:20:11.280]  Not always identical, but fairly similar.
[01:20:11.280 --> 01:20:18.280]  And much of the transportation code information that I have in that particular package can
[01:20:18.280 --> 01:20:24.280]  be translated to other states fairly easily if you are willing to do the necessary time
[01:20:24.280 --> 01:20:26.280]  search required to make that happen.
[01:20:26.280 --> 01:20:31.280]  So, if you haven't done that and you don't have the seminar, you might want to consider
[01:20:31.280 --> 01:20:35.280]  getting it because it's very handy to have once you get a citation.
[01:20:35.280 --> 01:20:39.280]  And it can be translated very easily across many of the states.
[01:20:39.280 --> 01:20:43.280]  I can't really tell you which ones because they're slightly different in how they work
[01:20:43.280 --> 01:20:44.280]  each one.
[01:20:44.280 --> 01:20:47.280]  California, for instance, treats them as civil infractions and not criminal.
[01:20:47.280 --> 01:20:50.280]  Therefore, the method of handling them is completely different.
[01:20:50.280 --> 01:20:56.280]  However, I have an article on my legal blog for handling such issues in states where such
[01:20:56.280 --> 01:20:58.280]  a civil infraction exists.
[01:20:58.280 --> 01:21:03.280]  And you can actually go there and do a search for civil infractions on my legal blog at
[01:21:03.280 --> 01:21:09.280]  tauoflaw.wordpress.com and look at the article, Civil Infractions and What to Do If Your State
[01:21:09.280 --> 01:21:10.280]  Has Them.
[01:21:10.280 --> 01:21:16.280]  Read that and it will give you seven interrogatories that you need to file in the form of a written
[01:21:16.280 --> 01:21:21.280]  application for discovery through an interrogatory that will prevent them from being able to
[01:21:21.280 --> 01:21:27.280]  prosecute anything against you because the moment the officer stopped you without probable
[01:21:27.280 --> 01:21:34.280]  cause, which he could not have in a civil infraction, that made his seizure of you illegal.
[01:21:34.280 --> 01:21:38.280]  That made everything he did at that stop illegal.
[01:21:38.280 --> 01:21:40.280]  It's called Fruit of the Poison Tree Doctrine.
[01:21:40.280 --> 01:21:44.280]  And you can fight your case based on that alone as well as many other things.
[01:21:44.280 --> 01:21:49.280]  But that one is one of the primary violation of rights that states with civil infractions
[01:21:49.280 --> 01:21:53.280]  actually perform when they stop you.
[01:21:53.280 --> 01:21:54.280]  All right.
[01:21:54.280 --> 01:21:58.280]  That being said, let's start number three again since we got interrupted right in the middle
[01:21:58.280 --> 01:21:59.280]  of it.
[01:21:59.280 --> 01:22:05.280]  In addition to one and two, number three, how is it to be legally determined that an operator
[01:22:05.280 --> 01:22:10.280]  failed to maintain and control his or her speed within the numerical speed limit identified
[01:22:10.280 --> 01:22:18.280]  by sections 545.352 and displayed on the posted speed sign identified by section 201.904 upon
[01:22:18.280 --> 01:22:23.280]  that specific part of the public right away so as to be unable to avoid a collision with
[01:22:23.280 --> 01:22:28.280]  another person or vehicle already upon or entering the highway in compliance with law
[01:22:28.280 --> 01:22:33.280]  by also failing to take into consideration the circumstances, conditions and other potential
[01:22:33.280 --> 01:22:39.280]  hazards that would affect the operator's ability to avoid such a collision pursuant 545.351.
[01:22:39.280 --> 01:22:45.280]  In other words, these statutes cannot be logically or legally read and interpreted apart from each
[01:22:45.280 --> 01:22:50.280]  other without completely altering the legal meaning and application of each beyond the
[01:22:50.280 --> 01:22:54.280]  scope of the legal subject matter stated by the legislature at the time of enactment,
[01:22:54.280 --> 01:22:59.280]  which was that of the commercial profession or occupation of transportation and the driving
[01:22:59.280 --> 01:23:02.280]  and operating of commercial motor vehicles.
[01:23:02.280 --> 01:23:10.280]  The state of Texas never provides proper notice of, enumerates or proves all of the required
[01:23:10.280 --> 01:23:13.280]  legal elements of any speeding allegation.
[01:23:13.280 --> 01:23:18.280]  Issue, what are the actual legal elements of a speeding charge that the state is required
[01:23:18.280 --> 01:23:23.280]  to allege in both a complaint and accompanying valid charging instrument so as to provide
[01:23:23.280 --> 01:23:28.280]  the accused with sufficient notice of the charge and proved by admissible evidence at trial,
[01:23:28.280 --> 01:23:31.280]  the admissible facts and evidence at trial.
[01:23:31.280 --> 01:23:36.280]  If one clearly understands the legally interdependent statutory relationship between
[01:23:36.280 --> 01:23:43.280]  Texas 201.904, 545.351 and 352 of the transportation code, then the elements of an
[01:23:43.280 --> 01:23:47.280]  alleged speeding offense that are required to be alleged in the complaint and charging
[01:23:47.280 --> 01:23:52.280]  instrument and then proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial all become crystal clear.
[01:23:52.280 --> 01:23:58.280]  All one need do is to survey the provisions of the three statutes together and determine
[01:23:58.280 --> 01:24:03.280]  what legal facts, persons and objects are contained therein and enumerate them in the
[01:24:03.280 --> 01:24:07.280]  circumstantial facts alleged in the complaint and charging instrument.
[01:24:07.280 --> 01:24:13.280]  Engaged, engaging in transportation is the primary element that must be alleged
[01:24:13.280 --> 01:24:16.280]  and proven in all transportation code offense cases.
[01:24:16.280 --> 01:24:22.280]  Respondent contains that the overall primary legal context of any transportation code
[01:24:22.280 --> 01:24:26.280]  related offense is legislated to be defined as that of transportation.
[01:24:26.280 --> 01:24:31.280]  Additionally, as the laws of statutes must be read and interpreted according to their
[01:24:31.280 --> 01:24:39.280]  actual legislative subject and object context pursuant sections 311.011 Texas Government Code,
[01:24:39.280 --> 01:24:44.280]  the primary element that must be stated in any criminal complaint and charging instrument
[01:24:44.280 --> 01:24:50.280]  alleging the commission of any transportation related offense is that the accused was
[01:24:50.280 --> 01:24:55.280]  engaged or engaging in transportation at the time of the alleged offense.
[01:24:55.280 --> 01:25:00.280]  Anything else is an attempt to unconstitutionally separate the legislative object,
[01:25:00.280 --> 01:25:06.280]  which is the offense itself, from the legislative subject matter in context of transportation.
[01:25:06.280 --> 01:25:14.280]  Thus, unconstitutionally and unlawfully removing the legislative context and logically converting
[01:25:14.280 --> 01:25:21.280]  the legislative object into an entirely separate and independent legislative subject in violation
[01:25:21.280 --> 01:25:26.280]  of the no bill shall contain more than one subject provision of Article 3, Section 35
[01:25:26.280 --> 01:25:29.280]  of the Texas Constitution.
[01:25:29.280 --> 01:25:34.280]  Reading definitions of terms and phrases using the subject matter context makes the legal
[01:25:34.280 --> 01:25:37.280]  meaning and intent much clearer.
[01:25:37.280 --> 01:25:41.280]  Respondent contains that the courts of Texas have failed to properly interpret the contextual
[01:25:41.280 --> 01:25:45.280]  meanings of the terms and phrases defined within the transportation code,
[01:25:45.280 --> 01:25:50.280]  choosing instead to impart the terms and phrases with meanings that are nowhere to be found
[01:25:50.280 --> 01:25:53.280]  within the actual legislation in context.
[01:25:53.280 --> 01:25:57.280]  However, respondent contains that this problem has a rather simple solution,
[01:25:57.280 --> 01:26:04.280]  that of reading the actual statutory definition or provision inclusive of the legislative context.
[01:26:04.280 --> 01:26:11.280]  For example, let's use the term operator as defined by Section 541.001 Transportation Code,
[01:26:11.280 --> 01:26:18.280]  which reads, persons in this subtitle operator means, as used in reference to a vehicle,
[01:26:18.280 --> 01:26:23.280]  a person who drives or has physical control of a vehicle.
[01:26:23.280 --> 01:26:29.280]  In this statute, the legal and statutory context for both the terms persons and operators is
[01:26:29.280 --> 01:26:31.280]  that of transportation.
[01:26:31.280 --> 01:26:36.280]  Therefore, the simple solution to properly understanding the true subject matter context
[01:26:36.280 --> 01:26:40.280]  and meaning is to read both parts of the statutes thusly.
[01:26:40.280 --> 01:26:48.280]  Section 541.001 Persons, in this subtitle for the purposes or for purposes relating to
[01:26:48.280 --> 01:26:53.280]  engaging in or for the purposes relating to transportation,
[01:26:53.280 --> 01:26:58.280]  one operator means, as used in reference to a vehicle,
[01:26:58.280 --> 01:27:06.280]  a person who drives or has physical control of a vehicle for the purpose of engaging in transportation.
[01:27:06.280 --> 01:27:11.280]  The other elements of an alleged speeding offense that are always unlawfully missing
[01:27:11.280 --> 01:27:14.280]  from the complaint, charging instrument, and evidence.
[01:27:14.280 --> 01:27:18.280]  Respondent contains that besides the element of transportation,
[01:27:18.280 --> 01:27:23.280]  a speeding offense must also assert a combination of other elements found
[01:27:23.280 --> 01:27:30.280]  in Sections 201.904, 545.351 through 352 of the Transportation Code.
[01:27:30.280 --> 01:27:36.280]  The complaint and charging instrument must contain not only the identity or description
[01:27:36.280 --> 01:27:40.280]  of the accused individual and the standard elements of alleged speed,
[01:27:40.280 --> 01:27:45.280]  posted speed limit, location, date, time, weather conditions, highway service conditions,
[01:27:45.280 --> 01:27:49.280]  and that the speed was neither reasonable nor prudent under the circumstances
[01:27:49.280 --> 01:27:56.280]  or conditions then existing, but the instruments must also contain other specific factual elements
[01:27:56.280 --> 01:28:00.280]  reporting the state's claim that the speed was not reasonable and prudent
[01:28:00.280 --> 01:28:05.280]  rather than merely basing such claims solely upon the inadmissible opinion
[01:28:05.280 --> 01:28:09.280]  and legal presumption of the accusing witness, usually the arresting officer
[01:28:09.280 --> 01:28:12.280]  or the prosecutor or the judge.
[01:28:12.280 --> 01:28:17.280]  Therefore, respondent contains that in addition to the elements of transportation
[01:28:17.280 --> 01:28:20.280]  and the standard required elements listed, SUPRA,
[01:28:20.280 --> 01:28:24.280]  the complaint and charging instrument must also contain elements alleging
[01:28:24.280 --> 01:28:29.280]  that the accused individual was actually acting as an operator pursuant
[01:28:29.280 --> 01:28:36.280]  Sections 545.351A and 351B for the purpose of transportation
[01:28:36.280 --> 01:28:41.280]  and actually was operating one of the classifications of commercial motor vehicle,
[01:28:41.280 --> 01:28:48.280]  specifically enumerated in Section 201.904 Transportation Code for the purpose of transportation
[01:28:48.280 --> 01:28:54.280]  and actually failed to exercise due care regarding some specifically stated actual
[01:28:54.280 --> 01:29:03.280]  or potential hazard then existing pursuant Sections 545.351B2 and 545.351C
[01:29:03.280 --> 01:29:07.280]  and actually failed to properly control the speed of the commercial motor vehicle,
[01:29:07.280 --> 01:29:14.280]  pursuant Sections 545.351B2 and that the excess speed is what actually prevented them
[01:29:14.280 --> 01:29:22.280]  from avoiding a collision with another person or vehicle pursuant Section 545.352B2
[01:29:22.280 --> 01:29:29.280]  or 351B2 and that the other person or vehicle was either already upon
[01:29:29.280 --> 01:29:37.280]  or entering the highway in compliance with law when the collision occurred pursuant 545.351B2.
[01:29:37.280 --> 01:29:40.280]  All right, folks, we'll continue this on the other side.
[01:29:40.280 --> 01:29:44.280]  Y'all hang in there and we will be right back.
[01:30:02.280 --> 01:30:06.280]  Here in the US you can name your child pretty much anything you want,
[01:30:06.280 --> 01:30:10.280]  but naming and weird spelling won't fly in other parts of the world.
[01:30:10.280 --> 01:30:13.280]  I'm Dr. Catherine Albrecht and I'll be back in just a moment
[01:30:13.280 --> 01:30:37.280]  with some surprising laws about baby names.
[01:30:44.280 --> 01:30:46.280]  Is it a girl or a boy?
[01:30:46.280 --> 01:30:50.280]  In Denmark and Germany you should be able to tell by the baby's name.
[01:30:50.280 --> 01:30:51.280]  It's the law.
[01:30:51.280 --> 01:30:56.280]  For example, the name Matty is verboten in Germany because it could cause gender confusion.
[01:30:56.280 --> 01:31:00.280]  Several countries won't allow names considered harmful to a child's self-image.
[01:31:00.280 --> 01:31:05.280]  The names Adolf Hitler and Satan are banned in New Zealand, which might be understandable,
[01:31:05.280 --> 01:31:10.280]  but fans of the king of rock and roll might wonder why the name Elvis has been rejected in Sweden.
[01:31:10.280 --> 01:31:16.280]  What's not surprising is that Chinese baby naming laws reflect the country's control agenda.
[01:31:16.280 --> 01:31:20.280]  Parents must give newborns names that can be easily scanned by a computer
[01:31:20.280 --> 01:31:23.280]  for the country's national ID card program.
[01:31:23.280 --> 01:31:25.280]  I'm Dr. Catherine Albrecht.
[01:31:25.280 --> 01:31:51.280]  More news and information at CatherineAlbrecht.com.
[01:31:56.280 --> 01:31:57.280]  And we deserve the truth.
[01:31:57.280 --> 01:32:26.280]  Go to RememberBuilding7.org today.
[01:32:27.280 --> 01:32:31.280]  Call 617-912-992-8745 or go to hillcountryhomeimprovements.com.
[01:32:31.280 --> 01:32:36.280]  Mention the crypto show and get $100 off, and we'll donate another $100 to the Logos Radio Network
[01:32:36.280 --> 01:32:38.280]  to help continue this programming.
[01:32:38.280 --> 01:32:43.280]  So if those out-of-town roofers come knocking, your door should be locked in.
[01:32:43.280 --> 01:32:53.280]  That's 512-992-8745 or hillcountryhomeimprovements.com.
[01:32:53.280 --> 01:32:54.280]  Discounts are better.
[01:32:54.280 --> 01:32:58.280]  or hillcountryhomeimprovements.com. Discounts are based on full roof replacement.
[01:32:58.280 --> 01:33:02.280]  I mean, I actually be kidding about chemtrails.
[01:33:02.280 --> 01:33:06.280]  You're listening to the Logos Radio Network
[01:33:06.280 --> 01:33:26.280]  at LogosRadioNetwork.com.
[01:33:36.280 --> 01:34:04.280]  Logos Radio Network
[01:34:04.280 --> 01:34:10.280]  Logos Radio Network
[01:34:10.280 --> 01:34:14.280]  Alright folks, we are back and we're going to continue on with this as quickly as we can.
[01:34:14.280 --> 01:34:18.280]  We're almost down to the end of it here.
[01:34:18.280 --> 01:34:24.280]  Okay, respond to contends that all or most of these additional required elements are always missing from any complaint
[01:34:24.280 --> 01:34:28.280]  and or proper charging instrument for a speeding allegation. They're missing for
[01:34:28.280 --> 01:34:32.280]  every allegation and transportation code as far as
[01:34:32.280 --> 01:34:36.280]  the engaged in transportation part codes.
[01:34:36.280 --> 01:34:40.280]  Which is a complete denial of the right of due process because there is a
[01:34:40.280 --> 01:34:44.280]  complete failure to inform the accused individual of the maturing cause
[01:34:44.280 --> 01:34:48.280]  or to provide sufficient notice of the elements of the offense.
[01:34:48.280 --> 01:34:52.280]  Elements that the state is not only required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial
[01:34:52.280 --> 01:34:56.280]  but would also prove the existence of and provide
[01:34:56.280 --> 01:35:00.280]  access to an ironclad affirmative and exculpatory
[01:35:00.280 --> 01:35:04.280]  defense against the totally false allegation. It also
[01:35:04.280 --> 01:35:08.280]  unlawfully provides the state with an unfair and prejudicial advantage in obtaining
[01:35:08.280 --> 01:35:12.280]  speeding convictions in that the state is not being required
[01:35:12.280 --> 01:35:16.280]  to fully allege and prove the entire set of elements required to actually
[01:35:16.280 --> 01:35:20.280]  constitute a valid allegation and commission of an offense.
[01:35:20.280 --> 01:35:24.280]  Thus, the courts of Texas have created an unconstitutional interpretation of the
[01:35:24.280 --> 01:35:28.280]  statutes relating to a speeding allegation that provides a
[01:35:28.280 --> 01:35:32.280]  free pass and get out of jail free card allowing officers of the state
[01:35:32.280 --> 01:35:36.280]  and its political subdivisions to knowingly and willfully defraud an extort
[01:35:36.280 --> 01:35:40.280]  respondent and others similarly situated. Therefore, respondent contains
[01:35:40.280 --> 01:35:44.280]  that it is logically impossible to legally classify someone
[01:35:44.280 --> 01:35:48.280]  as an operator of a commercial motor vehicle under the transportation
[01:35:48.280 --> 01:35:52.280]  code without first having facts and evidence proving that they were
[01:35:52.280 --> 01:35:56.280]  in fact acting in a professional or occupational capacity for the purpose
[01:35:56.280 --> 01:36:00.280]  of engaging in transportation at the time of the alleged offense.
[01:36:00.280 --> 01:36:04.280]  Without proof of transportation, the legal classifications of
[01:36:04.280 --> 01:36:08.280]  operator, driver, speeding, driver's license, registration,
[01:36:08.280 --> 01:36:12.280]  commercial motor vehicle and all the other defined terms and phrases within the
[01:36:12.280 --> 01:36:16.280]  entirety of the transportation code have no legal application as they
[01:36:16.280 --> 01:36:20.280]  do not legally exist anywhere outside of the subject matter
[01:36:20.280 --> 01:36:24.280]  context of the occupations and transportation codes and neither
[01:36:24.280 --> 01:36:28.280]  does a single transportation code related offense including but not limited
[01:36:28.280 --> 01:36:32.280]  to speeding. Thus, respondent contains that it is legally
[01:36:32.280 --> 01:36:36.280]  impossible for the state to first charge someone with an offense
[01:36:36.280 --> 01:36:40.280]  that is codified only within the transportation code and thus
[01:36:40.280 --> 01:36:44.280]  only within the subject matter context of transportation and then
[01:36:44.280 --> 01:36:48.280]  fail or refuse to alleging the complaint and charging instruments that
[01:36:48.280 --> 01:36:52.280]  the accused individual was engaged in transportation at the time
[01:36:52.280 --> 01:36:56.280]  of the alleged offense and then do not be required to prove the element of
[01:36:56.280 --> 01:37:00.280]  transportation with admissible evidence such as a commercial logbook,
[01:37:00.280 --> 01:37:04.280]  a bill of lading, a passenger manifest or a signed admission
[01:37:04.280 --> 01:37:08.280]  by the accused individual.
[01:37:08.280 --> 01:37:12.280]  Anything else is a case without any substantive evidence
[01:37:12.280 --> 01:37:16.280]  supporting the allegation and is based entirely upon the
[01:37:16.280 --> 01:37:20.280]  accusing officers, prosecutors and judges equally
[01:37:20.280 --> 01:37:24.280]  unsubstantiated personal opinions, presumptions,
[01:37:24.280 --> 01:37:28.280]  personal perspectives and beliefs and or legal conclusions of the
[01:37:28.280 --> 01:37:32.280]  law. Therefore, respondent contains that a fair and impartial
[01:37:32.280 --> 01:37:36.280]  trial on any transportation code related offense is impossible
[01:37:36.280 --> 01:37:40.280]  as the Texas courts, prosecutors and law enforcement agencies
[01:37:40.280 --> 01:37:44.280]  have all conspired and colluded to ensure that these essential
[01:37:44.280 --> 01:37:48.280]  elements are neither required to be observed by the officer at the time
[01:37:48.280 --> 01:37:52.280]  of the alleged offense, alleged in the complaint and charging instruments
[01:37:52.280 --> 01:37:56.280]  nor proven at trial with admissible facts and evidence thus allowing
[01:37:56.280 --> 01:38:00.280]  the state and its political subdivisions to illegally convict
[01:38:00.280 --> 01:38:04.280]  millions of people and fraudulently extort them for literally billions
[01:38:04.280 --> 01:38:08.280]  of dollars every single year for an offense that is out of statutorily
[01:38:08.280 --> 01:38:12.280]  impossible for them to have committed in the first place or
[01:38:12.280 --> 01:38:16.280]  that the state has failed to properly charge, provide notice
[01:38:16.280 --> 01:38:20.280]  of and provide all the necessary elements of at trial.
[01:38:20.280 --> 01:38:24.280]  The entire process of prosecuting a transportation code
[01:38:24.280 --> 01:38:28.280]  related offense is demonstrably absolutely fraudulent and corrupt.
[01:38:32.280 --> 01:38:36.280]  The real problem for the state of Texas improving a speeding allegation
[01:38:36.280 --> 01:38:40.280]  is that there is no such offense defined in the entire transportation
[01:38:40.280 --> 01:38:44.280]  code or other law.
[01:38:44.280 --> 01:38:48.280]  Issue, within the transportation code where is speeding or speeding
[01:38:48.280 --> 01:38:52.280]  on state highways specifically defined as an offense?
[01:38:52.280 --> 01:38:56.280]  Where do the terms prohibited offense and misdemeanor
[01:38:56.280 --> 01:39:00.280]  actually appear in relation there too and how can the absence
[01:39:00.280 --> 01:39:04.280]  of any such defined offense be legitimately reconciled
[01:39:04.280 --> 01:39:08.280]  with the provisions and prohibitions of section
[01:39:08.280 --> 01:39:12.280]  1.03 Texas penal code?
[01:39:12.280 --> 01:39:16.280]  If an offense is not defined within the law, then how does it constitute
[01:39:16.280 --> 01:39:20.280]  an offense? How does an officer obtain any articulable
[01:39:20.280 --> 01:39:24.280]  facts that would support reasonable suspicion or probable cause
[01:39:24.280 --> 01:39:28.280]  supporting the belief that someone is guilty of committing a non-existent
[01:39:28.280 --> 01:39:32.280]  offense? How is such a level of ignorance and incompetence
[01:39:32.280 --> 01:39:36.280]  of the laws associated with the performance of one's
[01:39:36.280 --> 01:39:40.280]  official legal duties to be considered a mere mistake of law?
[01:39:40.280 --> 01:39:44.280]  How do officers, prosecutors, and judges actually
[01:39:44.280 --> 01:39:48.280]  and properly enforce, prosecute, or adjudicate offenses
[01:39:48.280 --> 01:39:52.280]  if none of them have ever read and studied the actual text
[01:39:52.280 --> 01:39:56.280]  of the law or statute so as to fully understand the elements
[01:39:56.280 --> 01:40:00.280]  of the offenses codified therein or included by necessary
[01:40:00.280 --> 01:40:04.280]  inference of other imperimateria laws and statutes?
[01:40:04.280 --> 01:40:08.280]  The fondant contends that Texas law does not authorize law enforcement
[01:40:08.280 --> 01:40:12.280]  officers, prosecutors, or judges to simply create
[01:40:12.280 --> 01:40:16.280]  offenses out of thin air or to define existing offenses
[01:40:16.280 --> 01:40:20.280]  in ways that allow them to encompass any subjects, persons,
[01:40:20.280 --> 01:40:24.280]  or objects that the language of the law or statute does not clearly
[01:40:24.280 --> 01:40:28.280]  bring within its application or that is specifically excluded by omission
[01:40:28.280 --> 01:40:32.280]  or direct exclusion, which is precisely the case
[01:40:32.280 --> 01:40:36.280]  with any alleged speeding offense, as there is no such offense
[01:40:36.280 --> 01:40:40.280]  specifically defined by any law or statute. Thus,
[01:40:40.280 --> 01:40:44.280]  there can be no illegal conduct defined as speeding,
[01:40:44.280 --> 01:40:48.280]  nor can there be a breach of any legal duty by doing that which is not
[01:40:48.280 --> 01:40:52.280]  prohibited by law or statute, pursuant sections 1.03a
[01:40:52.280 --> 01:40:56.280]  or 03b, Texas Penal Code, which states
[01:40:56.280 --> 01:41:00.280]  1.03, effective code
[01:41:00.280 --> 01:41:04.280]  A, conduct does not constitute an offense
[01:41:04.280 --> 01:41:08.280]  unless it is defined as an offense by statute,
[01:41:08.280 --> 01:41:12.280]  municipal ordinance, order of a county commissioner's court,
[01:41:12.280 --> 01:41:16.280]  or rule authorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute.
[01:41:16.280 --> 01:41:20.280]  Every one of those, but the first one is unconstitutional, by the way,
[01:41:20.280 --> 01:41:24.280]  because none of those other things are law
[01:41:24.280 --> 01:41:28.280]  according to the Texas Constitution and who is authorized to make
[01:41:28.280 --> 01:41:32.280]  any public law. It's not law upon the public at a minimum.
[01:41:32.280 --> 01:41:36.280]  B, the provisions of
[01:41:36.280 --> 01:41:40.280]  Titles 1 and 2 and 3 apply to offenses
[01:41:40.280 --> 01:41:44.280]  defined by other laws unless the statute defining
[01:41:44.280 --> 01:41:48.280]  the offense provides otherwise. So that means that what we just
[01:41:48.280 --> 01:41:52.280]  read in A is 100% applicable to the transportation
[01:41:52.280 --> 01:41:56.280]  code as other laws, okay?
[01:41:56.280 --> 01:42:00.280]  So they cannot say there's no relationship between 1.03a
[01:42:00.280 --> 01:42:04.280]  and the transportation code because B says otherwise.
[01:42:04.280 --> 01:42:08.280]  Respondent further contends that nowhere in the entirety
[01:42:08.280 --> 01:42:12.280]  of the transportation code is there an offense defined as
[01:42:12.280 --> 01:42:16.280]  speeding. There is no language anywhere in the Penal and Transportation Code
[01:42:16.280 --> 01:42:20.280]  that reads a person commits an offense if or a person
[01:42:20.280 --> 01:42:24.280]  is presumed guilty of in relation to speeding.
[01:42:24.280 --> 01:42:28.280]  Furthermore, nowhere do the terms prohibited,
[01:42:28.280 --> 01:42:32.280]  offense, or misdemeanor appear in sections 201.904
[01:42:32.280 --> 01:42:36.280]  or 545.351 through 352 of the transportation
[01:42:36.280 --> 01:42:40.280]  code in relation to speeding. And these are the only
[01:42:40.280 --> 01:42:44.280]  imperimaterious statutes on that subject in the entire transportation code.
[01:42:44.280 --> 01:42:48.280]  Further, Respondent contends that even though
[01:42:48.280 --> 01:42:52.280]  545.351a transportation code reads
[01:42:52.280 --> 01:42:56.280]  an operator may not drive and the phrase may not
[01:42:56.280 --> 01:43:00.280]  is defined by section 311.016 sub-item 5
[01:43:00.280 --> 01:43:04.280]  of Texas government code as meaning imposes a prohibition
[01:43:04.280 --> 01:43:08.280]  and is synonymous with shall not, this language alone
[01:43:08.280 --> 01:43:12.280]  is not enough to actually define an offense.
[01:43:12.280 --> 01:43:16.280]  Respondent also contends that the language of section 542.301a
[01:43:16.280 --> 01:43:20.280]  transportation code is vague and ambiguous
[01:43:20.280 --> 01:43:24.280]  in how an offense is to actually be defined so as to be compliant
[01:43:24.280 --> 01:43:28.280]  with sections 1.03a and 0.03b
[01:43:28.280 --> 01:43:32.280]  Texas Penal Code, SUPRA, and provides
[01:43:32.280 --> 01:43:36.280]  far too much capricious and arbitrary power to officers, prosecutors,
[01:43:36.280 --> 01:43:40.280]  and judges alike to create offenses where none actually
[01:43:40.280 --> 01:43:44.280]  exists or an offense consisting of legal elements that are completely unsupported
[01:43:44.280 --> 01:43:48.280]  by the language of the law or statute.
[01:43:48.280 --> 01:43:52.280]  Alright, I'll finish this up when we get on the other side or at least as much of it as I can get.
[01:43:52.280 --> 01:43:56.280]  I realize it's a last segment folks, so I may not get the calls tonight
[01:43:56.280 --> 01:44:00.280]  but y'all hang on and keep listening, we will be right back.
[01:44:00.280 --> 01:44:04.280]  Are you being harassed by debt collectors with phone calls, letters, or even lawsuits?
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[01:46:00.280 --> 01:46:04.280]  EZ.
[01:46:04.280 --> 01:46:08.280]  Know when the day I was born
[01:46:08.280 --> 01:46:12.280]  I was a dog out of my own
[01:46:12.280 --> 01:46:16.280]  I said joy they had found
[01:46:16.280 --> 01:46:20.280]  The nurse spoke up, said leave this one alone
[01:46:20.280 --> 01:46:24.280]  She could tell right away that I was bad to the bone
[01:46:24.280 --> 01:46:28.280]  Bad to the bone
[01:46:28.280 --> 01:46:32.280]  Bad to the bone
[01:46:32.280 --> 01:46:36.280]  Bad to the bone
[01:46:36.280 --> 01:46:40.280]  Bad to the bone
[01:46:40.280 --> 01:46:44.280]  I broke a thousand hearts before I met you
[01:46:44.280 --> 01:46:48.280]  I broke a thousand more baby
[01:46:48.280 --> 01:46:52.280]  I want to be yours pretty baby
[01:46:52.280 --> 01:46:56.280]  Yours and yours alone
[01:46:56.280 --> 01:47:00.280]  I'm here to tell you honey that I'm bad to the bone
[01:47:00.280 --> 01:47:04.280]  Bad to the bone
[01:47:04.280 --> 01:47:08.280]  Bad to the bone
[01:47:08.280 --> 01:47:12.280]  Alright folks, we are back. This is
[01:47:12.280 --> 01:47:16.280]  Rule of Law Radio. Alright, now
[01:47:16.280 --> 01:47:20.280]  let's see if we can continue on down through here and get this done.
[01:47:20.280 --> 01:47:24.280]  Lastly, respondent also contains that the language of section
[01:47:24.280 --> 01:47:28.280]  542.301B transportation code is vague
[01:47:28.280 --> 01:47:32.280]  and ambiguous as to what class of misdemeanor an offense defaults
[01:47:32.280 --> 01:47:36.280]  to and nowhere within the transportation code has responded located
[01:47:36.280 --> 01:47:40.280]  a provision that defines or identifies the default class of misdemeanor
[01:47:40.280 --> 01:47:44.280]  to that of class C fine only. In fact, the only place
[01:47:44.280 --> 01:47:48.280]  for respondent can find such language is within section
[01:47:48.280 --> 01:47:52.280]  12.03B Texas Penal Code which reads
[01:47:52.280 --> 01:47:56.280]  1203 classification of misdemeanor sub-item B. An offense
[01:47:56.280 --> 01:48:00.280]  designated a misdemeanor in this code without
[01:48:00.280 --> 01:48:04.280]  verification as to punishment or category is a class C misdemeanor.
[01:48:04.280 --> 01:48:08.280]  There is no such language in the transportation
[01:48:08.280 --> 01:48:12.280]  code as a matter of default. Now
[01:48:12.280 --> 01:48:16.280]  in fact, the only thing transportation code says is it's a misdemeanor
[01:48:16.280 --> 01:48:20.280]  but it doesn't give it a class of misdemeanor.
[01:48:20.280 --> 01:48:24.280]  So right there we've got a problem. They're taking
[01:48:24.280 --> 01:48:28.280]  what the penal code says is limited to that specific
[01:48:28.280 --> 01:48:32.280]  code once again and trying to apply it everywhere
[01:48:32.280 --> 01:48:36.280]  else. Alright?
[01:48:36.280 --> 01:48:40.280]  Respondent contends that this general assignment of the classification of class C
[01:48:40.280 --> 01:48:44.280]  to any unclassified misdemeanor is specifically limited
[01:48:44.280 --> 01:48:48.280]  by the language of 12.03B penal code
[01:48:48.280 --> 01:48:52.280]  to offenses defined only within the penal code i.e. in this
[01:48:52.280 --> 01:48:56.280]  code and is wholly and applicable to any other code
[01:48:56.280 --> 01:49:00.280]  including but not limited to the transportation code.
[01:49:00.280 --> 01:49:04.280]  Respondent further contends on this point that the premise
[01:49:04.280 --> 01:49:08.280]  whereby penal code definitions can be applied across all codes
[01:49:08.280 --> 01:49:12.280]  is notwithstanding as section 12.03B
[01:49:12.280 --> 01:49:16.280]  does not define the term misdemeanor in any way
[01:49:16.280 --> 01:49:20.280]  but only deals with assigning a classification
[01:49:20.280 --> 01:49:24.280]  to an unclassified misdemeanor offense defined by
[01:49:24.280 --> 01:49:28.280]  the penal code. Now understand that distinction people.
[01:49:28.280 --> 01:49:32.280]  The courts have ruled that definitions of terms
[01:49:32.280 --> 01:49:36.280]  within the penal code can be used across all
[01:49:36.280 --> 01:49:40.280]  codes but this provision 12.03B
[01:49:40.280 --> 01:49:44.280]  of the penal code is not a definition
[01:49:44.280 --> 01:49:48.280]  it sets a classification. It doesn't define
[01:49:48.280 --> 01:49:52.280]  anything. It assigns a default classification
[01:49:52.280 --> 01:49:56.280]  to those misdemeanors stated in the
[01:49:56.280 --> 01:50:00.280]  penal code that don't have a class of misdemeanor
[01:50:00.280 --> 01:50:04.280]  assigned to them. It's not a definition.
[01:50:04.280 --> 01:50:08.280]  Therefore the courts own
[01:50:08.280 --> 01:50:12.280]  argument would prevent it from being used in the transportation code
[01:50:12.280 --> 01:50:16.280]  but that's not all we're looking at here.
[01:50:16.280 --> 01:50:20.280]  Therefore there is no specifically defined
[01:50:20.280 --> 01:50:24.280]  defense of speeding or speeding on public highways
[01:50:24.280 --> 01:50:28.280]  within the entirety of the transportation code
[01:50:28.280 --> 01:50:32.280]  and where there is no offense defined by statute
[01:50:32.280 --> 01:50:36.280]  there is no criminal conduct or breach of a legal duty.
[01:50:36.280 --> 01:50:40.280]  Respondent concedes that it is entirely possible for an officer
[01:50:40.280 --> 01:50:44.280]  to make a mistake of law in relation to one
[01:50:44.280 --> 01:50:48.280]  maybe even two of the necessary elements of a particular
[01:50:48.280 --> 01:50:52.280]  offense. This is not an issue of an officer simply
[01:50:52.280 --> 01:50:56.280]  being mistaken about just one, two or even three
[01:50:56.280 --> 01:51:00.280]  required elements of an offense. It is a public showcasing
[01:51:00.280 --> 01:51:04.280]  of the officer's complete ignorance and incompetence relating
[01:51:04.280 --> 01:51:08.280]  to his or her official duties about what properly constitutes
[01:51:08.280 --> 01:51:12.280]  more than half of the most essential elements required for an alleged
[01:51:12.280 --> 01:51:16.280]  transportation related offense and that are actually necessary
[01:51:16.280 --> 01:51:20.280]  to accuse someone of committing it. There simply
[01:51:20.280 --> 01:51:24.280]  isn't any reasonably logical or legal way for these two
[01:51:24.280 --> 01:51:28.280]  just-opposing facts to exist in the same scenario
[01:51:28.280 --> 01:51:32.280]  and yet here we are. Therefore
[01:51:32.280 --> 01:51:36.280]  can it really be considered a valid mistake of law by a public
[01:51:36.280 --> 01:51:40.280]  servant where the only reason for the mistake is
[01:51:40.280 --> 01:51:44.280]  willful or negligent ignorance or incompetence in learning how to
[01:51:44.280 --> 01:51:48.280]  properly perform their official duties in a manner consistent with the
[01:51:48.280 --> 01:51:52.280]  law and the constitutional protection of respondent's individual rights
[01:51:52.280 --> 01:51:56.280]  and those of the public in general. How is a public servant's refusal
[01:51:56.280 --> 01:52:00.280]  or inability to read and learn the law so as to properly
[01:52:00.280 --> 01:52:04.280]  understand, apply and enforce it to be presumed and believed
[01:52:04.280 --> 01:52:08.280]  by respondent or other similarly situated to be a mere
[01:52:08.280 --> 01:52:12.280]  mistake when no member of the general public including respondent
[01:52:12.280 --> 01:52:16.280]  may make a similar claim that ignorance of the law is an acceptable
[01:52:16.280 --> 01:52:20.280]  excuse for the commission of an offense against another person or property.
[01:52:20.280 --> 01:52:24.280]  Therefore one can only conclude that this is not simply
[01:52:24.280 --> 01:52:28.280]  a situation involving a public officer's mere mistake of law, but
[01:52:28.280 --> 01:52:32.280]  rather it is a situation where everyone involved, the officer,
[01:52:32.280 --> 01:52:36.280]  prosecutor, judge and defense counsel are all completely
[01:52:36.280 --> 01:52:40.280]  ignoring the law and acting in unison to completely undermine
[01:52:40.280 --> 01:52:44.280]  and violate respondent's due process rights and the rights of others
[01:52:44.280 --> 01:52:48.280]  similarly situated for the complete financial benefit of the state,
[01:52:48.280 --> 01:52:52.280]  its political subdivisions and to line the pockets of the law
[01:52:52.280 --> 01:52:56.280]  enforcement officers and attorneys in general with
[01:52:56.280 --> 01:53:00.280]  overtime pay and legal fees respectively. Issue.
[01:53:00.280 --> 01:53:04.280]  How does a law enforcement officer obtain reasonable suspicion or probable
[01:53:04.280 --> 01:53:08.280]  cause to believe that someone has committed a crime that does not
[01:53:08.280 --> 01:53:12.280]  actually exist in law or statute thus legitimizing the concept
[01:53:12.280 --> 01:53:16.280]  that public servants actually are allowed to use ignorance of the law as an excuse
[01:53:16.280 --> 01:53:20.280]  for their own incompetence and the violation of individuals' rights
[01:53:20.280 --> 01:53:24.280]  that always results therefrom.
[01:53:24.280 --> 01:53:28.280]  Let's see.
[01:53:28.280 --> 01:53:32.280]  I must ask these questions again. If an offense
[01:53:32.280 --> 01:53:36.280]  is not defined within the law then how does it constitute an offense
[01:53:36.280 --> 01:53:40.280]  and how does an officer obtain any articulable facts that would support reasonable
[01:53:40.280 --> 01:53:44.280]  suspicion or probable cause for a non-existent offense?
[01:53:44.280 --> 01:53:48.280]  How is total ignorance and incompetence in the law translated
[01:53:48.280 --> 01:53:52.280]  into mere mistake of law?
[01:53:52.280 --> 01:53:56.280]  And why are there two sets of standards on ignorance of the law not being a valid
[01:53:56.280 --> 01:54:00.280]  excuse for not knowing it, one for the public and the other for public servants?
[01:54:00.280 --> 01:54:04.280]  If there is no offense defined in the law that sets forth
[01:54:04.280 --> 01:54:08.280]  reasonable specific elements necessary to prove its commission and without
[01:54:08.280 --> 01:54:12.280]  which an officer could not possibly obtain articulable facts by which
[01:54:12.280 --> 01:54:16.280]  to substantiate reasonable suspicion or probable cause to suspect
[01:54:16.280 --> 01:54:20.280]  the commission of such an offense then what articulable facts would
[01:54:20.280 --> 01:54:24.280]  an officer actually be able to take notice of to support reasonable
[01:54:24.280 --> 01:54:28.280]  suspicion or probable cause to actually detain and or arrest someone
[01:54:28.280 --> 01:54:32.280]  for an offense that does not exist anywhere in the law in the first place?
[01:54:32.280 --> 01:54:36.280]  The State of Texas never provides a constitutionally proper determination
[01:54:36.280 --> 01:54:40.280]  of probable cause to the accused in any Class C fine only case.
[01:54:40.280 --> 01:54:44.280]  Issue, where is the alternative legal authority and process
[01:54:44.280 --> 01:54:48.280]  to be found authorizing and instructing a magistrate on how to conduct
[01:54:48.280 --> 01:54:52.280]  a proper probable cause determination for both the Class C fine only
[01:54:52.280 --> 01:54:56.280]  offense and the warrantless seizure arrest and or search legally inherent
[01:54:56.280 --> 01:55:00.280]  there too if the examining trial process codified in Chapter 16
[01:55:00.280 --> 01:55:04.280]  and the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is not the proper method about which to conduct
[01:55:04.280 --> 01:55:08.280]  such a proceeding. Respondent has searched the entirety of the
[01:55:08.280 --> 01:55:12.280]  Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and can find only one single process by which a probable cause
[01:55:12.280 --> 01:55:16.280]  determination is to be made in relation to any criminal allegation
[01:55:16.280 --> 01:55:20.280]  and that process is the examining trial codified within Chapter 16 therein.
[01:55:20.280 --> 01:55:24.280]  Respondent can find no alternative method or procedure by which
[01:55:24.280 --> 01:55:28.280]  a probable cause determination in order signed by a neutral detached magistrate
[01:55:28.280 --> 01:55:32.280]  may be provided to respondent or other similarly situated.
[01:55:32.280 --> 01:55:36.280]  Without a proper probable cause determination, respondent is forced to ask
[01:55:36.280 --> 01:55:40.280]  how a prosecution can commence or proceed and upon what facts and evidence
[01:55:40.280 --> 01:55:44.280]  as no probable cause determination has been made as to the constitutionality
[01:55:44.280 --> 01:55:48.280]  or legality of how such facts and evidence were obtained without
[01:55:48.280 --> 01:55:52.280]  a proper warrant or a determination as how such facts or evidence could be
[01:55:52.280 --> 01:55:56.280]  admissible if it were unconstitutional or illegally obtained by law enforcement
[01:55:56.280 --> 01:56:00.280]  ab initio. This is equally true as to how
[01:56:00.280 --> 01:56:04.280]  such unconstitutional or illegally obtained evidence could be submitted to the
[01:56:04.280 --> 01:56:08.280]  court by an alleged attorney for the state to proceed with the prosecution
[01:56:08.280 --> 01:56:12.280]  without respondent or those similarly situated having any opportunity to
[01:56:12.280 --> 01:56:16.280]  challenge the admissibility of the evidence by seeking its suppression.
[01:56:16.280 --> 01:56:20.280]  Furthermore, the filing of a motion for discovery would do nothing to
[01:56:20.280 --> 01:56:24.280]  establish a appealable error or provide adequate remedy for those who are denied a
[01:56:24.280 --> 01:56:28.280]  proper probable cause determination in order. As the examining trial process
[01:56:28.280 --> 01:56:32.280]  is the initial phase for the court to actually determine the admissibility
[01:56:32.280 --> 01:56:36.280]  of any facts, testimony or evidence as well as to obtain a written and verified
[01:56:36.280 --> 01:56:40.280]  record of the testimony of all witnesses for the purpose of support or
[01:56:40.280 --> 01:56:44.280]  impeachment at trial. Again,
[01:56:44.280 --> 01:56:48.280]  the case of screws versus United States. There have been
[01:56:48.280 --> 01:56:52.280]  conflicting views in the court as to the proper construction of the due process clause.
[01:56:52.280 --> 01:56:56.280]  The majority having quite consistently construed it in broad
[01:56:56.280 --> 01:57:00.280]  general terms. Thus, it was stated in Twining versus New Jersey to 11
[01:57:00.280 --> 01:57:04.280]  U.S. 78 at 101 that due process requires
[01:57:04.280 --> 01:57:08.280]  that no change in ancient procedure can be made
[01:57:08.280 --> 01:57:12.280]  which disregards those fundamental principles to be ascertained
[01:57:12.280 --> 01:57:16.280]  from time to time by judicial action which have relation to process
[01:57:16.280 --> 01:57:20.280]  of law and protect the citizen in his private right and guard
[01:57:20.280 --> 01:57:23.280]  him against the arbitrary actions of government. In
[01:57:23.280 --> 01:57:27.280]  Snyder versus Massachusetts 291 U.S. 97 at 105,
[01:57:27.280 --> 01:57:31.280]  it was said that due process prevents state action which
[01:57:31.280 --> 01:57:35.280]  offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
[01:57:35.280 --> 01:57:39.280]  and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.
[01:57:39.280 --> 01:57:43.280]  The same standard was expressed in Palco versus Connecticut 302
[01:57:43.280 --> 01:57:48.280]  U.S. 319 and 325.
[01:57:48.280 --> 01:57:52.280]  Alright folks, I hate to say it but there is the music for the end of the show.
[01:57:52.280 --> 01:57:56.280]  We've got a couple more, maybe a half a dozen or so pages
[01:57:56.280 --> 01:58:00.280]  still left in this motion to go through but I will leave it up to you
[01:58:00.280 --> 01:58:04.280]  to read the rest of this and figure out how this all works because by going through it
[01:58:04.280 --> 01:58:08.280]  tonight and providing you with an explanation on a section by section basis
[01:58:08.280 --> 01:58:12.280]  it should be clear how this needs to be argued if they attempt to
[01:58:12.280 --> 01:58:16.280]  argue against it in the court. That is important. So as soon as
[01:58:16.280 --> 01:58:20.280]  this archive becomes available, I highly recommend you download it,
[01:58:20.280 --> 01:58:24.280]  pair it up with these documents from the article on the legal blog
[01:58:24.280 --> 01:58:28.280]  and use them to your advantage. I am currently working on a motion
[01:58:28.280 --> 01:58:32.280]  to go with this challenging
[01:58:32.280 --> 01:58:36.280]  or motion to quash the complaint and charging instrument because of
[01:58:36.280 --> 01:58:40.280]  the failure to state the proper elements of the offense.
[01:58:40.280 --> 01:58:44.280]  So that will be added to the blog article as well later when I complete it.
[01:58:44.280 --> 01:58:48.280]  In the meantime, folks, I want to thank you all for listening. Please donate
[01:58:48.280 --> 01:59:16.280]  as much as you can.
[01:59:18.280 --> 01:59:22.280]  This translation is highly
[01:59:22.280 --> 01:59:26.280]  accurate and it comes with over 13,000 cross references
[01:59:26.280 --> 01:59:30.280]  plus charts and maps and an outline for every book of the Bible.
[01:59:30.280 --> 01:59:34.280]  This is truly a Bible you can understand. To get your free copy
[01:59:34.280 --> 01:59:38.280]  of the New Testament recovery version call us toll free at
[01:59:38.280 --> 01:59:42.280]  888-551-0102. That's
[01:59:42.280 --> 01:59:46.280]  888-551-0102. Or visit this
[01:59:46.280 --> 01:59:50.280]  online at bfa.org.