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27.14D and it's just a couple of sentences here.

So the next time this judge in a municipal court tells you all and all we can proceed on complaint alone, pull out 27.14D and smack them right across the chops with it.

they are using Article 27.14D as in David, of the Code of Criminal Procedure

They rely on Chapter 45 and then they rely on 27.14D as in Delta

27.14D is where it says that if the defendant enters a plea of not guilty

27.14D on its face is unconstitutional because the court is attempting to exercise a jurisdiction to accept a plea

27.14D, all right?

with 27.14D and 45.01 Code of Criminal Procedure, 45.01 as everyone that's been to one of my

So how can two sections, 45.01 and 27.14d, how can those two sections override the requisites

27.14D, if written notice of an offense

make a waiver to the written complaint pursuant 27.14D

Yes, they are, because until somebody enters a plea, they're relying on 27.14d to make them not

27.14D of the Code of Criminal Procedure is where they get their idea of alleged authority

Not to mention the fact that the very last sentence in 27.14D only allows them to do

We did talk about some of the issues that I talked about tonight, the 27.14D section

what I explained earlier when they try to say that 27.14D allows them to use a citation

Article 27.14d, as in Delta.

Now notice right here in 27.14D, where it says that the defendant can plead guilty or

And the moment they quote 27.14D, object, prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecution is intentionally

They tried to do that in 27.14D of the Code of Criminal Procedure

That is Article 27.14D of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Now, what I was going to read to you is 27.14D, Code of Criminal Procedure, and show you exactly

So, let me read you 27.14D.

Here's what the legislature has tried to do under 27.14D with that declaration right there.

Correct. And if they attempt to use 27.14d object, defense has not filed a written waiver allowing you to proceed upon the citation alone.

of this fact. Our secondary proof is found in 27.14d. Now 27.14d is perhaps the most offensive

But 27.14d is the legislature's attempt to do an end run around the constitutional requirements

to do it like this. That's what 27.14d does and we should be stomping all over them because of it.

27.14d if written notice of an offense for which maximum possible punishment

and 27.14D cannot waive the constitutional requirement of how a court becomes vested with jurisdiction of a cause.

paper and you can see exactly where if you read 27.14d this guy doesn't know what he's

criminal procedure article 27.14d.

Now let me read you 27.14d which I've done dozens of times but we're going to do it

This none of 27.14d applies unless the last sentence is complied with.

So if that doesn't occur, 27.14d absolutely does not apply.

Because it is superseding the right established in 45.018b if 27.14d can do what this guy is

27.14d does.

Now, in order to counter this, we have to make this 27.14d argument.

Now let's look at what 27.14D attempts to do.

But they can't use the citation unless you signed a waiver under 27.14D, allowing them to do that.

They're not taking into consideration 1517G and 27.14D, however, where the statute clearly does not provide authority to issue an arrest warrant for failure to appear on a class C.

So that's what you need to find out in your statutes is whether or not there are specific things that apply that contradict the perception of it's available as a charging instrument because they tried to do that here under 27.14D.

27.14d. Okay.

Of course they never do it, but according to 27.14D, if the written notice for an offense,

Proof of that is in 15.17G of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 27.14D of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Okay, that simply won't fly.

When you look at 15.17G, 27.14D, you find out in 14.06B and C in correspondence with 1517G, you can see very quickly that the court's authority to issue a warrant for failure to appear is specific to 14.06C offenses.

Then you go to 27.14D, which says if the individual fails to appear on the notice to appear, the court shall ensure that the complaint is generated.

You also have 27.14D of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which specifically states that if the person fails to appear in a fine only offense in compliance with that notice to appear, then the judge's only authority is to secure a complaint.

No. The 543.009 is the transportation code. 15.17G, 14.06B and C, and 27.14D are articles of the code of criminal procedure.

The first one is 27.14D, where it specifically says that they can use the citation as the complaint if and only if the person to whom the citation was issued will sign a waiver that must be co-signed by the attorney for the state and submits it to the court.

There has to be a signed waiver with the signatures of both the accused individual and the attorney for the state before 27.14D can be operative.

Now, the other problem with 27.14D is that when they attempt to use this citation as a complaint, it violates 45.019F and it violates Article 5, Section 12B, Texas Constitution.

Now, the problem that creates under 27.14D is in order to do what that says to give the court jurisdiction to enter the plea on the citation, what instrument vested the court with jurisdiction of the cause?

Okay? Now, the other problem this creates under 27.14D, besides the fact that it does invest the court with jurisdiction of the cause, it doesn't contain any of the necessary elements, is that 27.14D specifically states that if the individual fails to appear in compliance with the notice to appear on the citation,

the only authority granted to the court is to secure a complaint. That's it. There's no authority under 27.14D to issue a warrant of arrest for failure to appear.

Yeah, but for those that don't, they're attempting to use 27.14d to make that assertion.

And 27.14d can only be applicable if the accused has a signed waiver that has both their signature and the prosecuting attorneys of the state on it,

We can also look at 27.14G or D of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and we find that in 27.14D, this actually precedes 15.17.

What 27.14D pretends to do is to waive the requirement of an actual verified complaint so that the individual can sign a written waiver.

Until that document is signed and filed, 27.14D cannot be used.

But anyway, let's continue with 27.14D so you can see what the legislature is trying to do in circumventing constitutional due process.

The 27.14D Code of Criminal Procedure reads, if written notice of an offense for which maximum possible punishment is by fine only, or a violation relating to the manner, time and place of parking has been prepared, delivered and filed with the court, and a legible duplicate copy has been given to the defendant,

So there is no way that 27.14D complies with other law relative to a sworn complaint.

So 27.14D falls flat on its face by not conforming with the requirements of a valid complaint under 45.019.

Okay, now, as we're seeing, 27.14D causes us a problem with this complaint.

That's exactly what 27.14D attempts to do multiple times.

There are no gray areas for subject matter jurisdiction and that's exactly what 27.14D attempts to create.

This statute, however, must be read in conjunction with Article 27.14d, which provides in part.

And 27.14d does exactly that.

When you read the last part of 27.14d, you come to a whole different conclusion.

Now, I'm going to read you the whole thing out of 27.14d.

it even says in 27.14D that if you proceed you've got to have a formal complaint, well,

The reference they're attempting to use is 27.14D of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Objection 27.14D applies only if there is a signed written waiver that both I and the

In fact 27.14d and 15.17 both require that if you fail to appear on a Class C the only thing the judge can do is get their hands on a complaint and send you a notice to actually appear.

That's illegal because under 27.14D the citation can be substituted for a complaint supposedly

They try to use that same excuse here in Texas saying 27.14D allows them to do that.

have a copy of the complaint, despite 45.018B, because of the language of 27.14D.

Now, first off, 27.14D was enacted back in 1993, all right?

And he cites that reference in Code of Criminal Procedure Article 27.14D.

So how, then, can 27.14D make a citation the equivalent of a complaint

If they write a ticket that you have to be in in 10 days for that initial appearance, and the 14-day local rule says if you're going to object to the complaint, you have to do so, and they're going to turn around and call the citation to complain under 27.14D,

Because they're saying they can't issue a proper complaint under 45.018A or B until you've pled not guilty under 27.14D.

So they're saying 27.14D has the authority to compel you to waive two protected due process rights in order to comply with their requirement under 45.018B of giving you the complaint one day prior to any proceeding in the prosecution.

Then 27.14D is violative of the right of due process in the very first instance

Alright, 27.14D of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it's fairly short, but this is what it reads

If you go on in 27.14D, you find this

Now, 27.14D of the Code of Criminal Procedure says that they can use the complaint or the citation as a complaint

One, 27.14D authorizes the citation to be used in lieu of a complaint only if there is a signed waiver that is signed by both the accused and the prosecutor that has been filed with the court.

27.14D has a jurisdictional violation associated with using the citation in lieu of a complaint because the citation does not meet the statutory requisites of a complaint. It is not sworn in any way, shape, or form as is required on a complaint.

And if they try to prosecute you using just the citation, you have to object because the statute they're attempting to use is 27.14D of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

When you read 15.17G, when you read 14.06B and C, when you read 27.14D, every one of them says exactly the same thing.

Look at the other statutes, 27.14D, where they try to say that they can use the citation as the complaint

Then 27.14D is in conflict with law, it is in conflict with case opinion

They rely on 27.14D to presume that the simple issuance of a citation is what invests the court with jurisdiction.

They rely upon 27.14D, and thus they begin their process based solely upon the citation.

had ever been filed, illegally violated 27.14D Code of Criminal Procedure by using a citation as

from you to do so and here in Texas that chapter that section is 27.14 and the specific one is 27.14d

There was a 27.14D, and there was a 1202, and they're both very telling there.

reduced here in this 27.14D.

This is the 27.14D.

This court did what 99.9% of the courts in this state do and that is to ignore the entirety of what is written in 27.14D of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

They all try to use 27.14D as if that is authorization enough for the court to proceed to trial based solely on the existence of a citation.

Now 27.14D short circuits that for the guilty and the no contest, but it doesn't do a thing for the not guilty.

The waiver is an imperative part of 27.14D and none of them ever get it.

This is the one they really like to abuse under 27.14d especially.

In Texas it's a 27.14D. It's a waiver that you sign and you tell the prosecutor, you don't have to go through all that paperwork. We don't have to jump through all the hoops.

without a signed waiver by you under article 27.14d

notice as if it were the complaint, and so take a look at that 27.14D and see if that

They are Code of Criminal Procedure 27.14D, 45.018A, 45.201A, C, and D, and Government Code 30.00011.